Iran’s Military Nuclear Program

Years of Strategic Deception and Concealment

Iranian Resistance impedes regime’s access to nuclear weapons

Lavizan-Shian Site, Iran - August 11, 2003

Lavizan-Shian Site, Iran - March 22, 2004

Aerial photographs of the Lavizan-Shian site before and after the complete clean-up

Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Iranian regime has a long history of activity to acquire a nuclear weapon. It has continually concealed and lied about its nuclear activities to the world.

The regime’s original plan to acquire five nuclear warheads and build a nuclear weapon was seriously setback by the disclosure of the Lavizan-Shian site in May 2003 and the regime was compelled to change its methods, organization, and research and development locations to achieve its goal after that. This resulted in delays in its plans and program.

In effect, tireless efforts by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), based on information received from the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK/PMOI), in exposing the Iranian regime’s nuclear duplicity and dangerous drive to obtain and blackmail the world with nuclear weapons, triggered inspections by the IAEA and ensuing measures adopted in the UN Security Council.

All the evidence cited in this report and all of that which has been learned about the regime’s efforts in these years, suggest that the clerical regime is covertly continuing its nuclear weapons drive, and that even the JCPOA has been unable to halt the regime’s military nuclear weapons projects, and that the regime has maintained, continued and furthered its military nuclear apparatus and activities in violation of the JCPOA.

It has become evident that the Iranian regime is using its covert military nuclear program as leverage to blackmail and secure concessions to offset its vulnerability domestically, regionally, and internationally, as regime survival becomes increasingly tenuous.

The world owes a debt of gratitude to the many brave Iranians affiliated with the Iranian Resistance who preempted, forestalled, and prevented the Iranian regime from obtaining nuclear weapons.

The Iranian regime cannot be trusted, and the international community must remain vigilant. The solution to preventing the regime from obtaining a bomb is not to appease or provide it with concessions or bargain with it over its illegitimate military nuclear project, but to pursue a firm and principled policy vis-à-vis this regime, until such time that Iran is represented by a democratic, secular, and non-nuclear government.
Years of Negotiation – Years of Deception

IRAN REGIME PARLIAMENT KEPT IN DARK

The Iranian regime's nuclear program was spawned and developed in a shroud of secrecy, lack of transparency, concealment, and deception, even within the regime itself from the beginning to the present day. Why would a peaceful nuclear program meant only for nuclear energy provision be treated with such top secrecy? A limited and set number of individuals have been involved in this project over the past thirty years. According to a confidential report of the Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament), titled “Performance Study of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran” that was first revealed by the Iranian Resistance in 2005, it becomes clear that the regime's nuclear program was not reported to the regime's Parliament. In part of this report, which was obtained by the MEK from sources within the regime, with the headline “Atomic Energy Organization Performance (Excluded from public appropriations)”, it is stated, “At this time, it was found that in two sites, in Natanz, with its centrifuge system, and in Arak, with the construction of a 40 MW reactor, some measures have been taken in this area. Unfortunately, the Islamic Consultative Assembly was not aware of these two major plans and related projects, and it is not clear to the legislature where the funding related to this plan has been provided from, and how the plan was initiated and implemented, just as there is no mention of these plans in the government’s three-year report.” At the end of the report, it is stated that “the Islamic Consultative Assembly's ignorance of the construction of the Natanz and Arak processes and the decision-making process on their construction and the allocation of their funding are among the vague and exploratory points of the organization's management report. The country has paid and will pay the costs arising out of such operations, which ultimately resulted in the signing of the Additional Protocol with many problems.”

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY OR NUCLEAR DUPLICITY, HASSAN ROUHANI’S CONFESSIONS

Hassan Rouhani’s book, “National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy”, the first edition of which was published in September 2011, and the second edition in April 2012, revealed the regime’s secret activities in the construction of Natanz and Arak sites as secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security of the regime. The book outlined the plan for nuclear negotiations with Western countries after 2003 and noted numerous instances of the regime’s deception and lies designed to fool the IAEA and thwart its investigation into the regime’s nuclear file, while continuing the regime’s nuclear activities. Some of Hassan Rouhani’s confessions in this book are as follows:

- In a letter to the heads of the regime, Rouhani suggests the objectives of negotiations and discussions with the Foreign Ministers of France, England and Germany to be, “If the case is referred to the Security Council, the issue will not merely be sanctions or a weak possibility of a military attack, but the more important issue is that our nuclear achievements may be at risk…

- “Our strategy must be multifaceted: preserving and completing the country’s nuclear achievements, preventing the referral of the case to the Security Council, turning the threat into an opportunity” …If one day we are forced to go to the Security Council, at least we must have laid the ground for it in advance. So, in the short term we should not allow the case to be referred to the Security Council,”

- In another section, he wrote, “I always believed that whenever we were confident about the ability
to enrich, with preliminary arrangements, it should be suspended. That is why we accepted the suspension voluntarily and for a short period of time. In a few letters to the heads of the state, I emphasized that we need several tons of UF6 to enter the enriching process, and in addition, our technology must be completed and materials and facilities transferred to a safe place (tunnel). The main goal of our diplomatic activities was firstly to give the opportunity to complete the country’s technology and reliable possibility to enrich and secondly build trust and resolve accusations and doubts. I’ve repeatedly told the head of the Atomic Energy Organization that every day that he can launch a 164 pilot within two months and reach 3.5 percent production, we will immediately abandon the suspension.\(^3\)

* The Daily Telegraph reported on March 5, 2006, that Hassan Rouhani had in a closed meeting, the content of which was provided by MEK sources in Iran, “revealed how Teheran played for time to dupe the West after its secret nuclear programme was uncovered by the Iranian opposition in 2002.”

**ADMISSIONS OF IRAN’S AEO CHIEF ON THE ARAK REACTOR HOAX**

During the JCPOA negotiations, the clerical regime continued its strategic deception. For example, Ali Akbar Salehi, in an interview with Iran’s state-run TV Channel 4 on January 22, 2019,\(^4\) commented on published reports about pouring concrete into the heart of the Arak reactor: “The Arak reactor has a cavity that is called Calandria. (The heart of the reactor) is placed in it and the fuel has to be put in it and we’ve taken out that tank (Calandria) because the design changes, the tank form has to be changed and we’re building another tank that’s in the reactor pit… Calandria, there are tubes where the fuel goes [in the calandria]. We had bought similar tubes, but I could not declare this at the time. Only one person in Iran knew this. We told no one but highest senior official of the state (Ali Khamenei), no one else knew that… His Excellency (Ali Khamenei) had said to be careful that these people are bad on promises, so we had to do our job intelligently and with wisdom, that is, in addition to not destroying the bridges behind us, we would build bridges that would allow to go back faster if we were to return. These are tubes with a diameter of two to three centimeters and a length of three or four meters that had a head and a tail, and we had bought the same quantity of similar tubes. When they told us to pour cement into the tubes… we said: ‘Fine. We will pour.’ But we did not tell them that we had other tubes. Otherwise, they would have told us to pour cement into those tubes as well. Now we have the same tubes.”

**HIDING MOHSEN FAHKRIZADEH, KEY ASSET OF MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM**

*The history of the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons manufacturing apparatus is tied to a key figure named Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, whose significance became more apparent after his death in October 2020. A summary of his background\(^5\) follows:*

“Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has been a member of the Revolutionary Guards since the beginning of the revolution. He studied nuclear engineering and worked at the IRGC Research Center since 1991 and has been a member of the faculty of physics at Imam Hussein University of the Revolutionary Guards since 1991, and after Sayyid Abbas Shahmoradi, he has been the head of the Center for Physical Research or Applied Physics (former name of the nuclear weapons manufacturer). Within the regime, the initial team of nuclear weapons manufacturers, was known as the Fakhrizadeh team. He used the pseudonym of Dr. Hassan
Mohseni within the regime. (Hassan was his father’s name and Mohsen is his first name, which was transformed into his family name in the pseudonym). The Iranian Resistance first identified Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi in 2004 as the chief person responsible for the regime’s nuclear weapons manufacturer. His name is on the UN Security Council’s list of sanctioned entities and persons in Resolution 1747. The International Atomic Energy Agency had asked to interview him for over 15 years until he was killed, a request that the regime had refused.

The confessions made by various regime officials after his killing in November 2020 further proved the extent of the Iranian regime’s military nuclear activities on the one hand, and on the other, its extensive lies and deception in the nuclear field. In an interview on December 7, 2020, Fereydoon Abbasi, one of the regime’s key nuclear figures, explained that the regime wanted to cover up Fakhrizadeh’s role in the nuclear field after Fakhrizadeh was killed, but that he (Abbasi) had disagreed with this. He continued to explain Fakhrizadeh’s record as follows:

- “Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was born in Qom and received a diploma in mathematics. When he arrived at the university, the war broke out and he went to the frontlines and was active as a fighter on the western and southern fronts of the country. When the university reopened, he entered Shahid Beheshti University and earned a bachelor’s degree in nuclear physics. Since he was a revolutionary guard, he worked at Imam Hussein University and in the Department of Physics... He entered the IRGC Ministry, where he was introduced to my unit, the Nuclear Defense Unit... We had bought equipment for nuclear defense, and he prepared to take over the equipment and in less than two years became the country’s first-class specialist in working with nuclear detectors and electronic systems.

- “... In the early 1990’s, he was the director of a division that was supposed to prepare the roadmap for the nuclear industry... In three years, he was able to design the roadmap for transforming Iran’s nuclear industry.

- “The country’s decision was that Martyr Fakhrizadeh mobilize the country’s defense capability in the service of the nuclear industry and photonics and audiology... I had the honor of working with him for 33 years.”

**IRAN RESISTANCE EXPOSES AND IMPEDES REGIME’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUEST**

Over the past 30 years, the Iranian Resistance has made dozens of disclosures about the mullahs’ regime’s nuclear program. It has published a number of books on the regime’s nuclear deceptions, including How Iran Regime Cheated the World in June 2014, A Writ of Deception and Cover-up: Iranian Regime’s Secret Committed Hid Military Dimensions of its Nuclear Program in February 2016 which is about the regime’s lies to the IAEA about possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program, Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Duplicity: An Analysis of Tehran’s Trickery in Talks with the P 5+1 in February 17, 2016, which is about Hassan Rouhani’s lies in the nuclear negotiations.
**Extent of Concealment and Deception on Military Nuclear Activities**

The biggest deception and concealment by the Iranian regime surround its military nuclear activities. The regime had initially prepared the AMAD plan to build five nuclear warheads to be installed on the Shahab 3 missile. Although the plan was publicly discontinued years later as the regime came under international scrutiny, it was however covertly restarted. A review of the number of sites that the regime has built throughout Iran for military nuclear activities highlights its strategy of concealment and deception.

In preparation for its 2020 quarterly reports, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inquired about four sites related to the regime's nuclear activities and three sites were inspected. Apart from these 4 sites, information on at least 15 other sites in connection with the regime's military nuclear activities have been detailed in this report. We examine a collection of these 19 sites in this report.

None of the below reported 15 sites were voluntarily announced by the Iranian regime and all have been revealed and exposed despite the regime's extensive concealment. This goes to show the dimensions of the regime's secret military nuclear activities and that its statements to the International Atomic Energy Agency are essentially unreliable and designed to deceive and divert from the truth of the military dimensions of its nuclear activities.
IRAN REGIME’S AMAD PLAN SETBACK DUE TO IRAN RESISTANCE’S MAJOR DISCLOSURES

The Iranian regime had initially embarked on a major nuclear weapons project known as the AMAD Plan that was severely curtailed due to disclosures surrounding its key site at Lavizan-Shian. This consequential setback delayed the regime’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons. The Iranian Resistance detailed this setback and delay in the regime’s drive for a nuclear weapon in December 2007 in response to the US National Intelligence Estimate that was published on December 3, 2007. The disclosures had forced the regime to not only delay its program but to change the whole structure of its nuclear weapons organization after 2003, as well as to destroy some sites associated with the project over the following years, including the Lavizan-Shian site and the Mobarakiyeh site, which were razed and destroyed. The regime, however, continued its secret military nuclear activities in other forms.

In the AMAD Plan, which started in 1999 and continued into 2003, all aspects of the production of a nuclear weapon were anticipated and a specific site was allocated for each part of the plan. But after the regime was forced to stop the project due to international scrutiny coming after disclosures by the Iranian Resistance, activity at some of these sites stopped or was reoriented to a more concealed nuclear weapons program. The nuclear weapons production phases include:

• Command of nuclear weapons manufacturing (Lavizan-Shian site)
• Uranium extraction and production of yellow cake (Gachin site)
• Production of uranium hexafluoride (Mobarakiyeh site known as Tehran site)
• Uranium Enrichment (Fordow site known as Al-Ghadir)
• Construction of nuclear weapons detonators (Sanjarian site known as Nurabad 1 and 2)
• Underground nuclear explosion testing (Semnan site known as Project Midan)
• Hydrodynamic testing (explosion chamber inside the Parchin site known as Taleghan)
• Nuclear weapons related high explosive tests (Abadeh site, also known as Marivan site)
• Uranium metal production (Daroodi site in Mahallati Industries)
• Final construction of a nuclear bomb (Boroujerdi site in the Parchin site)

REORIENTATION OF REGIME’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, HIGH CONCEALMENT

Since 2003, the organization tasked with nuclear weapons development in the Iranian regime has been continuously renamed, reorganized, and relocated to avoid detection. This has been the subject of several disclosures by the National Council of Resistance from 2003 to 2011 to expose these new organizations and the regime’s reorientations. These changes are also reflected in the chronology annex to the IAEA’s November 2011 report.12

In a September 2005 estimate of the regime’s nuclear weapons project status, the Iranian Resistance had announced that the Lavizan-Shian site’s disclosure had caused a one-year moratorium in the regime’s nuclear bomb construction at a minimum. The Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee Part of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Mohammad Mohaddessin,
remarked on this report: \footnote{\textsuperscript{13}}

“According to internal reports of the regime, the Lavizan-Shian site’s disclosure in March 2003 has inflicted the biggest setback to the regime’s nuclear weapons project. Given that the New Defense Technology Center, formerly situated at the Lavizan-Shian site, played a coordinating role in advancing the building of nuclear weapons, the disclosure has delayed the regime’s nuclear projects at least a year... Mohaddesin said that after the disclosure of Lavizan-Shian, the regime decided to disperse its nuclear weaponization apparatus and to not centralize it as in the past because they assessed a justification could be presented for the components of this dispersed program. Following this plan, the regime moved its secret activities to another location called “New Defense Readiness and Technology Center (Lavizan 2)” and from there to some other secret sites. It is very clear that military nuclear activities continued in 2004.”

In this way, a major blow was dealt to the regime’s secret military nuclear activities and the regime was forced to implement serious changes and deep camouflage in the continuation of its military nuclear activities.

On December 11, 2007, Mr. Mohammad Mohaddessin, at a press conference in Brussels\footnote{\textsuperscript{14}} on the National Intelligence Estimate by U.S. intelligence agencies published on December 3, 2007, detailed how the regime had been forced to suspend its initial plan to build a nuclear weapon in 2003 and reoriented and continued its nuclear weapons activities in new more concealed forms.

“Mohammad Mohaddesin then, referring to Khomeini’s letter emphasizing the necessity of acquiring “laser and nuclear weapons”, said that the regime’s halt of military nuclear activities in 2003 is related to the disclosure of the nuclear site of Lavizan-Shian, which was disclosed on March 5, 2003. The regime had 11 secret nuclear activities ongoing in this site, which has been established since 1989… For this same reason, the regime completely destroyed the site in late 2003, so that even the soil in the area was dug up and moved to an unknown location, to prevent the IAEA from accessing the activities of this center. The IAEA visited this site in June 2004, 15 months after the site was destroyed.
Unfortunately, the agency's delay in visiting the center caused it to visit the center after its destruction.

In internal documents of SPND\textsuperscript{15} Organization, the necessity of reorganizing and hiding the apparent activities of the nuclear weapons manufacture is emphasized again around September 2003 – after the Lavizan-Shian disclosure. According to the text of the top secret document, the decision to divide the AMAD Plan (Project 110) into two covert and overt segments was at the orders of the Iranian regime's Ministry of Defense which confirms the military nature of the nuclear project.

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\textit{In His Exalted (Allah's) Name}
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\textit{Planning of 110 based on new measures}

\textit{Introduction}

According to new measures introduced by the respected ministry official, the Technical Committee of Project 110 met intensively to plan for the adaptation of activities with the measures.

In the new approach, the work is divided into two general parts: covert (secret structure and objectives) and overt (conventional structure). In the covert work, the direct objective for completion of the whole plan ... has been contemplated, and in deference to the new measures, the work has been divided into two parts of uncontaminated and contaminated work. In the contaminated work part, which has been camouflaged to appear as part of the uncontaminated work, the focus of colleagues has been to make these parts mobile, so that we can both be safe from espionage activities and also to not leave any observable contamination. In the overt part of the work, the objective is the preparation and development of infrastructure, and the establishment of two university centers called “Institute of Applied Physics” and “Research Center for Explosion and Impact Technologies” are anticipated and proposed. It is also necessary to facilitate the use materials and engineering complexes of Malek Ashtar University. It should be noted that the two aforementioned centers will not have a direct relationship with [Project] 110 and will be associated with the institute or university organizationally, but due to the depth of coordination, it is necessary to appoint the person responsible for them on recommendation of the director of [Project].
1. Key Plans

1.1 Saqib 1: The system for static testing. The product which has been designated as a key plan and its technical specifications has been prepared. These technical specifications will be reviewed and approved by the technical committee of the project.

1.2 Saqib 2: The system for installation in the warhead. The technical specifications of this system will also be developed in such a way that it is in accordance with the 111 [Plan] flight parameters.

1.3 Saqib 3: Shahab 3 warhead equipped with Saqib 2

According to another Farsi language document of the SPND Organization related to the above document, in a meeting on October 25, 2003, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh states, “The goal and overall appearance is the announcement of the closure of Plan 110 and AMAD Project.”

According to this document, some of those present at that meeting included Dr. Seyed Mohammad Mehdi (Tehranchi), Engineer Mohsen (Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi), Dr. Fereydoon (Abbasi Davani), and Dr. Masood (Ali-Mohammadi).

This document confirms without doubt the validity of the Iranian Resistance’s detailed disclosure in December 2007 on the reason for the apparent closure of part of the regime’s military nuclear activity and its reorientation, restructuring, and new camouflaged continuation.
Iranian Regime’s Military Nuclear Sites

The most important military nuclear sites of the Iranian regime are listed here to highlight its deception. It is necessary to note that based on existing information, even more actual military nuclear sites exist in Iran.

1. Lavizan-Shian Site

This site was the command center of the nuclear weapons organization responsible for the AMAD Project to build five nuclear warheads. After the Iranian Resistance disclosed this site on May 15, 2003, the regime completely dismantled the site and relocated all equipment, removed the upper layers of earth to a depth of 4 meters, and only allowed IAEA inspectors to visit in June 2004. In an interview with the French daily Figaro on February 23, 2008, an inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Chris Charlier, explained that the earth at the Lavizan-Shian site was proven to be contaminated with uranium enriched up to 20%. The same site was mentioned again in the IAEA’s 2020 report as one of the military nuclear sites. The diagram of the AMAD project’s organizational

Aerial photographs of the Lavizan-Shian site before and after the complete clean-up
A chart indicates that the set of requirements for building a nuclear weapon and placing it on a missile had been anticipated. According to the diagram, the whole project was divided into four main projects.
2. Mojdeh Site (Lavizan 2)

After the disclosures about Lavizan-Shian, the regime was forced to replace it with a new site where the command of the nuclear weapons project would be based. The new site was known as Mojdeh or Lavizan 2. The Iranian Resistance disclosed the location of the site in April and November 2004. In these disclosures, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi was publicly identified by the Iranian Resistance as the head of the organization in charge of building nuclear weapons. In the following years, the IAEA demanded an interview with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi as the head of this organization, but the Iranian regime never allowed the IAEA to interview Fakhrizadeh. In the following years Mojdeh site activities changed and the main headquarters of SPND Organization was transferred to the Noor building near the same site. Mojdeh site became a part of activities related to SPND Organization with the aim of justifying such activities as academic and scientific research, including in the field of applied physics.
3. Gachin Mine Site

In order to create a complete cycle for the construction of a nuclear weapon in the AMAD Project, the operators of the nuclear weapons manufacturing organization had taken over an uranium extraction mine known as the Gachin mine in southern Iran near Bandar Abbas. They established a company called Kimia Maadan Company to conduct the extraction and production of yellow cake at the mine. This plan was part of the AMAD Project for uranium extraction and yellow cake production, but after revelations about the secret activities of the regime related to nuclear weapons and the entry of IAEA inspectors into Iran, responsibility for the company at Gachin mine was transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Atomic Energy Organization. It was then claimed that the company had been established in 2000 and dissolved in 2003. But the plan was part of the AMAD Project and according to the following document, it was in the hands of the Educational and Research Institute of the Defense Industries.
On February 30, 2008, the National Council of Resistance’s Defense and Strategic Research Commission disclosed that “the [Kimia Maadan] company was founded in conjunction with the IRGC and specifically for the same leaked nuclear activities, and later, for fear of IAEA inspections and inquiries, it was obliged to clean up and destroy all its records and documents so that it could claim that it had been suspended and closed in the same year 2003.”

In a cover-up of its nuclear weapons related activities, the regime transferred the company responsible for the Gachin mine from the Ministry of Defense to the Atomic Energy Organization in accordance with the following document. The text of this document clearly shows the regime’s intentional lying and its cover up of the Ministry of Defense’s involvement with this mine. This project was also named the Port Project as Gachin mine was situated close to Bandar Abbas, a major port on the coast of the Persian Gulf.
In His Exalted (Allah’s) Name

The minutes of the delivery and handoff of the Port Project

Following the approval of the Supreme Council of National Security and the approval of Mr. Aghazadeh, the following signatories reviewed the process of delivery and handoff of the Port Project and agreed as follows.

1. From 03/18/2004, the process of delivering the above project to the Atomic Energy Organization began.

2. It was decreed that the Atomic Energy Organization to the maximum of 12 Ordibehesht 1383 (May 10, 2004) in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Additional Protocol identify the aforementioned project as uranium mine and uranium concentrate factory under the supervision of the Atomic Energy Organization to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In this regard, at most until the above date, all documents and evidence... presentable to the Agency (IAEA) and the information that the Agency requires from the Islamic Republic of Iran... should be specified or requested after inspection, prepared by both organizations.

3. Be it decreed to the Atomic Energy Organization to provide all the different scenarios for this delivery and handoff in a way that is more consistent with the Agency’s inspections, and from among the options proposed by the two organizations (the option of companies affiliated to the organization or the option of Kimia Maadan Industrial Group) be reviewed and to announce its final opinion to the delivery provider at most until 04/10/2005.

5. One of the options approved in the preliminary review of the parties and was...
4. Malek Ashtar University

Malek Ashtar University is a research complex of the Ministry of Defense and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Mojdeh site is in the vicinity of this university. Various parts of the nuclear weapons manufacturing program, especially in the field of chemicals and metal materials, including the production of polonium 210 for the manufacture of neutron triggers have been carried out at Malek Ashtar University. In a cover up of the secret activities of the nuclear weapons manufacturer, the regime named Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi to the head of the university and defined the weapons manufacturer and Mojdeh site as its subset. This organization was again changed a while later.

5. Imam Hussein University

This university, which is considered the training center of the Revolutionary Guards, has a nuclear physics field in which Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi and Fereydoon Abbasi and a few other key personnel of the construction of nuclear weapons are lecturers. The regime transferred some of its equipment to Imam Hussein University after the destruction of the Lavizan-Shian site. IAEA inspectors found traces of enriched uranium in an inspection of these equipment, as stated in the IAEA’s report. The university being related to the IRGC, is listed as a technical university. The Imam Hussein University’s curriculum purportedly include activities related to laser enrichment.
of uranium as well as the construction of neutron generators and other nuclear weapons tests. In SPND Organization documents, there is also reference to a nuclear weapons research project at the university whose research fellow is Fereydoon Abbasi. All these activities were kept secret.

6. Sanjarian Site

This site, which consists of a series of tunnels under the mountains and facilities along the Jajrood River near the village of Sanjarian, is the location for tests related to the construction of nuclear weapons detonators. It is one of the divisions of the nuclear weapons manufacturer known as the METFAZ. The site was first disclosed by the Iranian Resistance in September 2009. SPND organization documents show the components inside the buildings of Sanjarian site and the details of the devices. These documents refer to this site as Nurabad, the report of the test review conducted at Sanjarian site states, “This archive contains a list of experiments conducted in the upper and lower test rooms of Nurabad from October 23, 2002, to December 10, 2002 (Figures 21 and 22). Tests show that during this period of approximately two months, the wave impact generator is being developed. Several tests are being conducted and reviewed to experiment with a smaller version warhead than what is used in a missile warhead.” SPND documents, such as photographs of the places inside this site, confirm the disclosure of the Iranian Resistance about Sanjarian site.
Sanjarian Site (continue)
7. Boroujerdi Site at Parchin Site

In the AMAD Plan for final assembly of nuclear warheads, a relatively separate tunnel, and facilities (2,000 square meters of infrastructure in total) were established inside the Parchin Site, which according to the AMAD Plan was named the Boroujerdi site. According to SPND documents, this complex includes various sections needed for the construction of nuclear weapons and there are also details of various plans for the construction of this site. However, due to the leaking of this project and scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Parchin site in 2004, according to the information received by the Iranian Resistance, the regime changed the application of this site and allocating it as the research center of Project 4, which is related to the regime’s missile industries. According to the documents of SPND Organization, in this complex, various necessary laboratories for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, including metal smelting workshop to produce uranium metal.
8. Fordow Site

This site, referred to as al-Ghadir in the AMAD Plan, was intended for enriching uranium for nuclear weapons with 3,000 P2 centrifuges. The existence of this site was revealed for the first time in 2005 by the Iranian Resistance. In September 2009, three Western heads of state announced the regime’s nuclear work at this site while strongly condemning it for not disclosing the site earlier. After the site was exposed, the regime quickly reoriented the use of this site and specifically its halls and quickly provided the system for the installation of P1 centrifuges and only then allowed the visit of IAEA inspectors. In documents of SPND Organization, the drilling plans of the Fordow site tunnel as well as the draft contract between the Atomic Energy Organization and the Ministry of Defense for enriching uranium above 3% at this site can be seen.
9. SPND Command Center, Noor Building

This center is the command center of the nuclear weapons manufacturer, SPND, and is in the north of Tehran near Mojdeh site. Mohsen Fakhriyazdeh Mahabadi’s main office was in this building. The address was first disclosed by the Iranian Resistance in 2013. Some of the front companies affiliated to SPND Organization are also based in the same location.

10. Noori Industry in Hemmat Missile Industries

Hemmat Missile Industries, which is dedicated to the construction of ballistic missiles such as Shahab 3 missiles, has a close relationship with the nuclear weapons manufacturer, SPND Organization. For instance, the Noori Industry, as part of the Hemmat Missile Industries, worked on the construction of a nuclear warhead for the Shahab 3 missile, which the Iranian Resistance disclosed in February 2008. According to disclosures by the Iranian Resistance, Dr. Kamran Daneshjoo (a minister in Ahmadinejad’s government) was responsible for the design of a missile warhead according to the AMAD Plan. Among SPND documents are designs for fitting a nuclear bomb on missile warhead. There is also a document that showing the regime planned to build five warheads. (Of course, the implementation
of this plan was halted and postponed by the disclosure of Lavizan-Shian)
11. Haft-e-Tir Site

Haft-e-Tir Site is one of the major centers of the regime’s defense industries located in Isfahan, which has participated in various segments of the construction of nuclear weapons. The regime created a tunnel complex for nuclear activities in the mountains inside this site, which the Iranian Resistance disclosed in 2013, and was named the “012” tunnel complex. In another disclosure, an expert at Imam Hussein University is quoted by the Iranian Resistance as saying, “Haft-e-Tir Site plays the same role as the METFAZ site in the manufacture of nuclear weapons detonators, in connection with the Mojdeh site (Nuclear Weapons Manufacturing Command Center) and Imam Hussein University of the Revolutionary Guards.”
12. Explosion Chamber Complex (on Parchin Site)

Part of hydrodynamic tests for the manufacture of nuclear weapons were carried out in the explosion chamber of the Parchin Site. Saeed Borji, one of the managers of the AMAD Plan, conducted this project with Ukrainian scientists and the chamber was built with their help. The IAEA asked to visit the site in 2012. The regime completely dismantled and washed over the site for about two years, and only then allowed the inspection. In 2014, the Iranian Resistance disclosed the details of the construction of these explosive chambers by Azarab Company in Isfahan. Photographs obtained from SPND documents show images of the explosion chambers inside the complex. According to SPND documents, the place is called Taleghan 1 and Taleghan 2. According to the disclosure of the Iranian Resistance in March 2021, Saeed Borji established a new company in Isfahan to build large spherical tanks. The company name is “Azar Afrooz Saeed Limited Liability Company” and was established in June 2015 in the field of “forming metals using gas force” in Isfahan. The company is building spherical tanks, and to form these tanks, an explosion is needed following similar physics for nuclear weapons detonators.

Saeed Borji has thus created a front company to continue nuclear-related activities.
A photograph of Saeed Borji at the company’s location in Isfahan is seen below.

13. Semnan Site

Within the scope of Semnan’s missile site, there is a site related to the SPND Organization, in which underground explosion tests related to nuclear weapons has been conducted. This site is located near the Semnan missile site. The existence of this explosives test site related to SPND Organization at the Semnan site was disclosed by the Iranian Resistance in April 2017. In part of this disclosure, it is stated that “METFAZ specialists go to Semnan firing range (air and space test area) weekly for some tests, and Brig. Gen. Mostafa Siri also travels along with the same teams.” Documents of the AMAD Plan, refer to underground explosion tests related to the construction of a nuclear weapon, as the Midan Project. In the following document dated 11/12/2000, the names of eight managers of the AMAD Plan, known as the Fakhrizadeh team, have been mentioned. They include (Mohsen) Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi) and (Fereydoon) Abbasi (Davani), Ali-Mohammadi, Naderi, Meghdadi, (Ali) Karimi, (Mansour) Asgari, (Mohammad Javad) Hadian(fard). Also, in the other document, the
coordinates of the pits in which the explosion took place, and in the other image, a picture of an explosives package to be sent into these wells is shown.
14. Abadeh Site (Marivan Site)

This site is located 30 kilometers north of Abadeh. The site is referred to as the Marivan Site in the AMAD Plan. After the IRGC learned that the site's location had been leaked, in July 2019, it abruptly demolished the facilities inside the site, and only after more than a year had passed, it provided access to IAEA inspectors on August 26, 2020. According to IAEA reports, traces of enriched uranium have been discovered at this site. In two disclosures in 2020 and 2021, the Iranian Resistance disclosed the IRGC's construction of this site and disclosed the site's relation to the METFAZ organization that was linked to the SPND Organization's divisions.
15. Daroodi Industry in Mahallati Industries

This site is located within Mahallati industries (Mechanical Industries of Hemmat Missile Industrial Group). Tests related to work on uranium metal and construction of semi-spheres of uranium metal by the Advanced Metal Materials Group (a subdivision of the regime’s nuclear weapons manufacturer) were conducted at this site. The Metal Materials Group (a subdivision of SPND) and work on the manufacture of uranium metal was first disclosed by the Iranian Resistance in 2011. SPND’s manufacturer has taken over one of the warehouses of the Mahallati Industries (Mechanical Industries), a subsidiary of Hemmat Missile Industrial Group, and separated it from other parts of the complex, referring to it as Daroodi. The site was later shut down and has not been inspected by IAEA investigators.
16. Torghuzabad Site

According to reports by the IAEA on March 3, 2020, an inspection of this site in 2020 found traces of enriched uranium. The spokesman for the regime’s Atomic Energy Organization, Kamalvandi, had announced earlier that the Torghuzabad site was private property. But after traces of enriched uranium were found, it became clear that the regime had lied. Comparing aerial photographs in 2017 (first aerial photo) and 2020 (second aerial photo) indicates the clean-up of the site.
17. Mobarakiyeh Site

This site was part of the AMAD Plan known as the Tehran Site, which according to SPND documents, was supposed to convert uranium into uranium hexafluoride. In the following years, the site was completely destroyed and turned into a cattle farm, but IAEA inspectors have recovered traces of enriched uranium after visiting it in 2020. Comparing air photography in 2004 and 2020 shows changes inside this site and the destruction of part of its facilities. The following Persian language document relates to the design of this site known as the Tehran Site.
18. Research Institute (in Plan 6 of Parchin Site)

The research institute located on the large site of Parchin is part of the activities of the METFAZ organization for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This site was disclosed by the Iranian Resistance in April 2017. In part of this disclosure it is stated, “After the signing of the JCPOA, to prevent the leaking of the activities of the METFAZ site, the regime has...”
transferred much of that site’s activities in Sanjarian and the personnel who worked on the site there to the research institute within the Parchin site, and the activities at Sanjarian site has decreased.”

19. Sorkheh Hesar Site

This site, located in the east of Tehran, has started its activity since 2017 and some divisions of SPND organization’s activities, including its geophysical group, have relocated to this site. The Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran in Washington disclosed the construction of the site in October 2020, indicating the continuation and expansion of the SPND Organization’s activities after the JCPOA.
Iranian Regime’s Work in All Three Segments of Nuclear Weapons Development

The regime has worked on all three segments of a nuclear weapons program that includes uranium enrichment, building nuclear weapons warheads, and delivery systems. The Iranian Resistance has exposed the regime’s plans in all three segments in scores of revelations as shown in the diagram below:
Conclusion

The facts and evidence of the Iranian regime’s long history of pursuing nuclear weapons show:

- The regime’s AMAD Plan was the culmination of an officially sanctioned program to develop nuclear weapons that started in the 1980s and developed into a full cycle weapons development program by 1999 with the approval and budget allocations for the construction of five nuclear warheads by the regime’s Supreme National Security Council.

- The Iranian Resistance’s revelations in August 2002, and particularly in May 2003 about the Lavizan-Shian site, blew the whistle on the regime’s illicit and covert nuclear weapons program and forced it to temporarily stop its AMAD plan, reorganize, reorient, relocate, and then continue its weapons program in a more concealed, camouflaged and dispersed way, leveraging dual-use technologies and programs to avoid detection.

- As the regime evaded IAEA inspections and UN Security Council resolutions in its new and evolving plan, the NCRI, based on information provided by the MEK from inside Iran, closely followed the regime’s steps and disclosed them as best possible in over 100 revelations, spotlighting the Iranian regime’s lies, deceptions, and continuous evasions, and drawing international attention to the dangers of the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons program, its untrustworthiness, deviousness, and treachery.

After over three decades of sparring with the Iranian regime to hold it accountable for its destructive quest to threaten the world with nuclear blackmail, and bankrupt the Iranian nation by plundering their wealth to waste on this reckless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the Iranian Resistance is proud to have assisted in vigilance vis-à-vis this destructive regime.

It is now time for the international community, the United Nations, and in particular Western governments to rise to this occasion and assume their responsibility to their own peoples and the world, and realize that the only way to deal seriously and decisively with such a regime, is to:

- Refer the Iranian regime’s nuclear file back to the UN Security Council and support imposing of all relevant UNSC resolutions

- Affirm that the Iranian regime has forfeited any right to any uranium enrichment under the NPT based on its history of deliberate lies and evasions – zero uranium enrichment

- Require IAEA inspections of all military nuclear related sites in Iran at anywhere and anytime under force of Chapter VII of the UN Charter

- Link the regime’s nuclear weapons ambitions and ballistic missile development, its domestic human rights violations and repression, its terrorism against dissidents abroad, and its destabilizing export of terrorism and conflict, and recognize that these are all interdependent parts of a comprehensive regime strategy and behavior aimed at imposing its intolerant and totalitarian ideology and rule anywhere it can.

It must be reiterated that the Iranian regime cannot be trusted, and the international community must remain vigilant. The solution to preventing the regime from obtaining a bomb is not to appease or provide it with concessions or bargain with it over its illegitimate military nuclear project, but to pursue a firm and principled policy vis-à-vis this regime, until such time that Iran is represented by a democratic, secular, and non-nuclear government.
Appendix A

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMAD – AMAD Project of Plan, Plan 110, Project to create nuclear weapons by Iranian regime

AEO – Atomic Energy Organization / Iran Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI)

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

IRGC – Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

JCPOA – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

MEK – Mujahed-e Khalq / People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)

METFAZ – Research Center for Explosion and Impact (Marakz-e Tahghighat va Tose’e Fanavari-e Enfejar va Zarbeh)

NCRI – National Council of Resistance of Iran

PLAN 110 – Internal Iranian regime code for AMAD Project

SPND – Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (Sazman-e Pazhouheshhaye Novin-e Defa’i’)

UN – United Nations

(Endnotes)


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7 National Council of Resistance of Iran – US Representative Office, How the Iranian Regime Deceived the World, June 8, 2014

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9 National Council of Resistance of Iran – US Representative Office, Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Duplicity: An Analysis of Tehran’s Trickery in Talks with the P 5+1, January 2018

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11 National Council of Resistance of Iran, Press Conference by Mohammad Mohaddessin, Brussels, December 11, 2007 – Disclosure of Mr. Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chairperson for Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, in response to the US National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iran’s nuclear file developed by U.S. intelligence agencies that was published on December 3, 2007; Reuters, “Exile group says Iran still pursuing nuclear arms”; December 11, 2007


14 National Council of Resistance of Iran, Press Conference by Mohammad Mohaddessin, Brussels, December 11, 2007

15 Institute of Science and International Security, “Breaking Up and Reorienting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program”, October 29, 2018

16 Institute of Science and International Security, “Breaking Up and Reorienting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program”, October 29, 2018

17 The killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, a key element in the construction of a nuclear weapon with a 33-year history, in 2020 dealt a major blow to the advancement of the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons project. But by maintaining the SPND Organization, the regime continues to pursue its secret plans to build a nuclear weapon.


20 A report published by French daily Le Figaro1 on February 23, 2008 is very telling. Chris Charlier, an IAEA inspector, said that in 2004, after much insistence, the team under his supervision was finally able to inspect the Lavizan nuclear center near southern Tehran. Despite the insistence of the inspecting team, for two months the gates of this center remained closed and finally, after they were granted permission to enter, the inspectors were astonished to see that the building had been completely demolished and the ground had been razed at a depth of four meters, then refilled. According to Le Figaro, the inspectors took samples to gain knowledge of these changes and developments, and in the recently returned dirt they found traces of uranium enriched up to 20%. Of course, at that time there were no signs of very advanced centrifuges that would be able to enrich uranium to such a level. However, in 2006 after the Iranian regime had time and again denied their existence, then President Ahmadinejad finally admitted to their being in use.

(Le Figaro, February 23, 2008, h.p://www.le)garo.fr/interna_onal/2008/02/22/01003320080222ARTFIG-
International Atomic Energy Agency, “NPT safeguards agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran”, GOV/2020/22, page 2, “The possible use or storage of nuclear material and/or conducting of nuclear-related activities, including research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, at a location in Iran specified by the Agency. This location may have been used for the processing and conversion of uranium ore including fluorination in 2003. This location also underwent significant changes in 2004, including the demolition of most buildings;”

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International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, GOV/2008/6, February 22, 2008 - Article 32 states: 32- “Iran stated that KM had had only one project — the one with the AEOI for construction of the Ghine UOC plant on a turnkey basis. However, the company had also helped with procurement for the AEOI because of the AEOI’s procurement constraints due to sanctions (GOV/2006/15, para. 39). A document listing items procured for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was provided by Iran. According to Iran, because of KM’s financial problems, the company ceased work on the Ghine project in June 2003, when the three-year contract with the AEOI came to an end. Iran stated that KM.”

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47 International Science and Security Institute, “Project Midan: Developing and Building an Underground Nuclear Test Site in Iran”, April 2, 2019


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