NCRI – In a webinar – a conference on the web – organised on ISCC Site (http://www.iraniscc.info) today, Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chair of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee spoke about critical aspects of the clerical regime’s meddling in Iraq. Following are excerpts of his remarks:
The documents and information I am going to present, shed light on the scope of the Iranian regime’s interference in Iraqi affairs.
One of these documents is the list of 32,000 agents of the mullahs’ regime in Iraq who receive monthly salaries from the Iranian regime. These people are currently in effect paid staff of the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. (IRGC-QF)
A top-secret document of the IRGC, it was obtained by the sources of the resistance inside Iran.
A few points on the list:
This list contains details of only 31,690 Iraqis who are primarily affiliated with the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, also known as SCIRI. But it is not limited to them and includes other individuals and groups in Iraq.
It contains the Iraqi and the Iranian name for each individual, meaning that these individuals, who are located in Iraq, also have an Iranian name.
All of these individuals are considered as official members of the IRGC.
The list contains the personnel code, the account number and the amount of monthly salary of each individual in the Iranian currency, Rial.
The list also contains the details of the each individual who is hired by the IRGC according to his personnel file, including the date of recruitment by the IRGC-QF and the Badr Brigade, the unit they served while they were in Iran, their military rank and code of personnel while working for the Qods Force.
I want to reiterate that this list only contains the details of individuals who were hired directly by the Qods Force in Iran and does not include individuals who have been recruited in Iraq in the course of the past four years. So in reality, the actual number of the Iranian regime’s agents in Iraq is much higher than the one on this list.
The Iranian regime has stationed its agents in all the major provinces of Iraq. As you can see, Baghdad and Basra have a very high number of agents and this the reason of the very unsafe situation in these two major cities.
This force was dispatched to Iraq in an organized way and in large groups shortly after the fall of the former Iraqi government in early 2003. They came through major border crossings under the direct command and supervision of the Qods Force, including IRGC Generals Qassem Suleimani, Iraj Masjedi, Ahmad Forouzandeh, and Hamid Taqavi.
The agents of the Iranian regime exposed in this document have an extensive presence and influence in Iraqi government agencies, in particular in the security apparatus some of which they control. They are the very same individuals who abducted two members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran in Baghdad in August 2005. There has been no news about their whereabouts for the past 18 months.
Some of these people are among senior political figures of Iraq. They receive monthly salary from the clerical regime, while they are considered as senior officials of the Iraqi government.
In order to control and keep track of various organs and their personnel, in all government agencies and in particular in military organs, some individuals function under the title of “Representative of Vali-e faqih” (representative of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei). These individuals report directly to Khamenei’s office. Even the head of that organ or office is not authorized to intervene in the affairs of the representatives of Vali-e faqih. Only Khamenei’s office has the authority to appoint or remove these so-called representatives. Since the Badr Corps is considered a functionary of the Qods Force, it is not an exception. In all of its units, departments and general command, representatives of Khamenei ensure that his orders and directives are pursued and carried out. They report directly to Khamenei’s Office.
There are 481 representatives of Khamenei in the Badr Corps. Some of them hold key positions in the Iraqi government and Parliament.
How are these agents paid?
Since the transfer of the Badr Forces to Iraq, its budget is being paid through the General Command of the Armed Forces in the Qods Force. This budget is under the title of “Budget and salary of extra-territorial forces.”
Members of the Qods Force take the money to border zone in Mehran (in the central sector of the border), where the money is handed over the Badr agents. Badr agents subsequently take the money to Iraq and transfer it to office of Abdul-Aziz Hakim in Jaderyieh district of Baghdad. SCIRI representatives go to Hakim’s office and receive their money.
The individual in charge of finances of SCIRI is named Abu Kawthar.
The representatives of Badr in various provinces go to Baghdad and to receive the money which they then take it to their provinces for distribution under the supervision of Badr officials.
In this stage I would like to explain a terrorist network of Iranian regime in Iraq. This regime has dozens similar networks in that country.
This specific network was established by one of its veteran agents. His Iraqi name is Jamal Jafar Mohammad Ali- Al-Ebrahimi. His Iranian name is Jamal Ebrahimi.
He is a notorious terrorist and was among those who had planned the explosion of American and British embassies in Kuwait in 1984. He has been staying in Iran ever since.
He was a commander of the Badr Corps for years and has gone through Command and General Staff training at Imam Hossein University of the Guards Corps in Tehran.
Following the downfall of the former Iraqi government in 2003, he went to Iraq. IRGC Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, the Commander of the Qods Force organized 950 veteran members of Badr Corps under Ibrahimi’s command and called this group “Tajamo-e Islami” or Islamic Assembly.
“Tajamo-e Islami” has branches throughout Iraq and has played a prominent role in setting up Shiite militias that are affiliated to the Iranian regime and its terror activities.
Ebrahimi is on official payroll of the Qods Force and his salary is 2600863 Rials ($300). His bank account number in Iran is 50100460275 and his salary code number in the Qods force is 3829770.
Setting up Hezbollah establishment in Iraq
One of the networks that Ebrahimi has established is the Iraqi Hezbollah. It is very similar to the Hezbollah in Lebanon and is active in Basra and Baghdad. This organization is in direct contact of the Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah. The members of Hezbollah go through military and terrorist training in Basra.
Ebrahimi sends his forces to Iran to receive special military and intelligence gathering trainings. They enter Iran across the southern border and are dispatched in groups of 20-50 individuals to Ahwaz and Tehran. They are trained by the Qods Force and the special training course is between 15-30 days.
The allocated budget for Ebrahimi’s network is 1.5 million dollars a month and is paid directly by the Qods Force.
Major part of terrorist operations in southern sectors of Iraq, in particular in Basra, al-emara, Nasserieh and Najaf areas, are carried out by ebrahimi’s network.
Ebrahimi is in direct liaison with IRGC Brigadier General Mojtaba Abtahi who is commander of Fajr garrison, one of the main bases of the Qods Force in southern Iran in Ahwaz.
Transfer of weapons and ammunition to Iraq
A significant number of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are used in Iraq are manufactured by the clerical regime and are sent to Iraq by the Fajr garrison.
According to our information, IEDs are manufactured in ammunition production section of the Defense Industries located in Lavizan in northern Tehran in three separate industrial sections called Sattari industries, Sayyad Shirazi industries, and Shiroodi industries. Each of these industries has it own specific production.
The orders for manufacturing highly explosive IEDs are given by the Bureau of Operations of the Qods Force to Sattari industries. Engineer Rahimi, deputy director of Sattari industries, is in charge of coordinating these projects.
IEDs are the primary types of weapons transferred at Shalamcheh border crossing in southern border.
In coordination with Fajr garrison, other weapons and ammunitions are transferred to Iraq through Bostan, Howizeh and Hour-al Azim border crossing in Missan province.
Conclusion:
What I have said sheds light on only a small portion of the Iranian regime’s meddling in Iraq.
The clerical regime, faced with intensifying domestic crisis and isolation inside Iran, views its only chance for survival in the establishment of a proxy regime in Iraq and the export of Islamic fundamentalism. By resorting to all sorts of means it is trying to achieve its objective in Iraq.
As scores of prominent Iraqis have underscored, Iraq is facing two occupations, with the Iranian regime being the main occupier.
Two forces are currently arrayed against one another in Iraq: democratic and patriotic forces vs. fundamentalist and extremist forces organized and led by the Iranian regime, which provides them with extensive financial, military and political support.
5.2 million Iraqis signed a declaration last June in which they said that the only way to establish democracy in Iraq is to cut off the hands of the mullahs’ regime and its agents in Iraq. They expressed their support for the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran in Iraq and the need for their stay in Iraq as a major barrier to the expansion of fundamentalism and terrorism emanating from the clerical regime ruling Iran.
The priority for the Tehran regime’s military apparatus, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the IRGC’s terrorist Qods Force, is to organize and direct the regime’s interference in, and the efforts to dominate Iraq. Iraq is the Iranian regime’s launching pad to dominate the entire region and install an Islamic Empire.
Iraq is the main battle ground between fundamentalism and democracy in the whole of the Middle East region. For this reason, the clerical regime views the People’s Mojahedin (PMOI), who are anti-fundamentalist Muslims, as the biggest barrier to its attempt to spreading influence in Iraq. As such, Tehran is doing its utmost to secure the extradition or the expulsion of the PMOI from Iraq. The removal of restrictions from the PMOI and the reaffirmation of their political refugee status in Iraq are a decisive factor in confronting the fundamentalism inspired by the Iranian regime.
Evicting Tehran from Iraq is the only solution to resolve the Iraqi crisis. Of course, as far as mullahs are concerned, they are using all the means at their disposal to step up their meddling in Iraq because it is indispensable to their survival. This explains why evicting the Iranian regime from Iraq and change in Iran are entwined.
