NCRI – On Monday, the UN Security Council adopted its third resolution imposing new sanctions against the ruling religious fascism in Iran. The new resolution underlines the contents of the previous resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 and reiterates that the regime had not cooperated with the additional protocol and not complied with the mandates of the IAEA Board of Governors. The following is the text of the resolution adopted:
Security Council
5848th Meeting (PM)
SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN‘S PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES, INCREASES VIGILANCE OVER IRANIAN BANKS, HAS STATES INSPECT CARGO
Adopting Resolution 1803 by 14-0-1, Council Welcomes Agreement between Iran,
Atomic Energy Agency to Resolve Outstanding Issues on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
The Security Council today approved a new round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as had been required in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and for taking issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) right to verify design information provided to it.
Adopting resolution 1803 (2008) by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (Indonesia), the Council, acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter [regarding binding measures not involving armed force], the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should, without delay, suspend the aforementioned activities, as required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (Press Release SC/8928 of 23 December 2006).
The Council called upon all States to exercise “vigilance and restraint” regarding entry into or transit through their territories of individuals engaged in or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.
In that connection, it decided that all States should notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2007) of such entry or transit, specifically of those people mentioned in the annex to resolution 1737, annex I to resolution 1747 (Press Release SC/8980 of 24 March 2007), or annex I and annex II (regarding procurement of prohibited items) of the current resolution, as well of additional persons so designated by the Council or the Committee.
The Council further extended the freezing of the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, including those mentioned in annexes I and II of the current resolution or designated by the Committee.
It called upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.
The Council also continued the blocking of the import and export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment, except when meant exclusively for use in light-water reactors with advance notice to the Committee.
States were also called upon to inspect cargo to and from Iran of aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided “reasonable grounds” existed to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting prohibited goods.
The Council welcomed the agreement between Iran and IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, and progress made in that regard, as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4). In that context, it stressed the willingness of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States to enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue with Iran, with a view to seeking long-term solution of the issue that would allow for wider cooperation and, inter alia, the start of direct talks.
The Council would suspend the sanctions if and for so long as Iran would suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by IAEA, but warned that, in the event Iran did not comply with relevant Council resolutions, it would decide on the adoption of further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII.
At the outset of the meeting, Iran’s representative said: “Today’s action of some members of the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.” Iran‘s nuclear programme had been and would remain absolutely peaceful and in no way posed any threat to international peace and security. It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview. The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the past several years.
By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran‘s past activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of the Agency, the country had removed any so-called “concerns” or “ambiguities” with regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and at present, he said.
He said the Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility and integrity of the Agency would only serve the interests of those who preferred to ignore IAEA, such as the Israeli regime, which, with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial manner. In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.
Although most Council members said they had voted in favour of the resolution because of Iran’s non-compliance with Council demands, as well as the IAEA stance that it could not guarantee that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes only, Indonesia’s representative, explaining his abstention, said: “Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme.” Conditions today were different than at the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007). Iran was cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture, more sanctions were not the best course.
The representative of the United Kingdom read a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, with support of the High Representative of the European Union, saying that today’s Council action reflected the international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme. “We deplore Iran‘s continued failure to comply with its United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related activities.”
Calling upon Iran to heed the requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, he said that the group of countries remained committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed their commitment to a dual-track approach. Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered “substantial opportunities” for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region. He urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a negotiated way forward.
The representative of the United States added that the international community had good reason to be concerned about Iran‘s activities, as the present regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world. Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan. The President of Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the United Nations. The ministerial statement showed a commitment to a diplomatic solution. “It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution. But our vote today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate their international obligations,” he said.
The representatives of South Africa, Libya, Viet Nam, France, China, Costa Rica, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Panama, Croatia and the Russian Federation also made statements.
The meeting was called to order at 12:45 p.m. and adjourned at 2:55 p.m.
Background
The Security Council met this afternoon to take action on a draft resolution regarding non-proliferation contained in document S/2008/141, sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
It also had before it a letter dated 22 February from the Permanent Representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General and the Council President (document S/2008/116). In it, the Ambassador writes that the latest report of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General of 22 February (GOV/2008/4) declares the full implementation of the work plan concluded between Iran and IAEA in August 2007 (INFCIRC/711) and, thus, resolution and closure of all outstanding issues. The Director General had stressed that “the Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings” and “considers those questions no longer outstanding”. The report also clearly attests to the “exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‘s nuclear programme”, both in the past and at present.
He writes that the consideration of Iran‘s peaceful nuclear programme was imposed on the Council by certain countries out of “mere political motivations and narrow national interests and on the basis of certain pretexts and allegations, which have been totally baseless”. The full implementation of the work plan has eliminated those pretexts and allegations. The current and other reports show that Iran is committed to its international obligations and, at the same time, persistent in pursuing and exercising its legal and inalienable rights.
He further states in his letter that, according to the IAEA report, the Agency had recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided, pursuant to the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as updated design information. Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and had provided relevant reports. It had also provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests.
It had now become clear, says Iran‘s Permanent Representative, that the country’s peaceful nuclear issue should be dealt with by the Agency as the sole pertinent international organization and that safeguards implementation in Iran had to be “in a routine manner from now on”. Further, “the Security Council should avoid inflicting more damage to the credibility and authority of IAEA, as well as its own credibility, by persisting in further illegal and illogical engagement and actions pursued by few countries,” he writes.
Draft Resolution
The full text of the draft resolution (document S/2008/141) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling the statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and reaffirming their provisions,
“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
“Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
“Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/48) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
“Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,
“Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General’s report of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,
“Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,
“Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
“Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
“Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),
“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,
“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;
“2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;
“3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);
“4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
“5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
“6. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;
“7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
“8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:
(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);
(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;
“9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);
“10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);
“11. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspectthe cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
“12. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;
“13. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;
“14. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;
“15. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;
“16. Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;
“17. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
“18. Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
“19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran‘s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
“20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
Resolution Annex I
1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)
2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)
4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)
5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)
7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)
8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))
9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine)
Resolution Annex II
A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager ( Arak)
B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)
1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
Resolution Annex III
1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)
2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
4. Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)
9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)
10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)