The Iranian regime must allow the United Nations weapons inspectors into the country as part of any deal on the regime’s nuclear weapons program, William Tobey wrote on Foreign Policy.
William Tobey, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, said current evidence suggested Iran was already cheating the West by continuing to try to build a nuclear bomb.
Mr Tobey wrote on the foreignpolicy.com website: “Just before Labor Day weekend, the State and Treasury Departments sanctioned several individuals and organizations ‘providing support to illicit Iranian nuclear activities’.
“It alleges work by ‘a Tehran-based entity that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development’. The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) answers to Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. According to the State Department, General Fakhrizadeh led such ‘efforts in the late 1990s or early 2000s’.
“The Department concludes that ‘the SPND took over some of the activities related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear program that had previously been carried out by Iran’s Physics Research Center (and other entities).
So the State Department is sanctioning an organization created in 2011 and referring to its illicit actions pursuing nuclear weapons in the present tense, charging that the work is ongoing.
“Sanctions announcements are not casually written on the backs of cocktail napkins. They are pored over by lawyers, policy makers, and intelligence officers for legal reasons and to protect intelligence sources and methods. They mean what they say.”
He added: “The International Atomic Energy Agency is also after General Fakhrizadeh. He is cited four times in its November 2011 report on the ‘possible military dimensions’ of Iran’s nuclear program, which states, ‘The Agency is concerned because some of the activities undertaken after 2003 would be highly relevant to a nuclear weapon program’. To date, General Fakhrizadeh has refused the IAEA’s repeated invitations to speak with them.”
A new report last month called ‘Examining 10 Warning Signs of Iran Nuclear Weapons Development‘ also describes a hidden Iranian weapons program, sheathed within civil nuclear work, drawing on a common base of people, procurement mechanisms, and technical organizations, Mr Tobey said.
He continued: “The report’s most sensational charge is that General Fakhrizadeh recently split his organization in two, relocating half of it in an attempt to elude inspectors and evade sanctions.
“If the newest allegations prove to be true, they will be devastating to the negotiations.
“Its contents, nonetheless, deserve careful examination. The group has been the source of important disclosures in the past, including the original August 2002 revelation of nuclear activities at Natanz and Arak.
“Tehran denies the agency’s charges, but refuses to provide the information necessary to resolve them.
“Some argue that these matters are of the distant past, or that we cannot expect Tehran to admit its illegal work, having denied it for so long. But these problems are not past. There are strong signs that nuclear weapons work continues. Understanding them is crucial to verifying and enforcing a new agreement. If we do not insist on answers before a comprehensive agreement is concluded, we will never get them.
“Secretary of State John Kerry and his team should use the new deadline for a deal to charge the IAEA to get to the bottom of the ‘possible military dimensions’ and the work cited in the August sanctions as a precondition to concluding any comprehensive agreement.
“If Tehran refuses, it will stand as stark evidence that Iran has no intention to honor its word. A negotiated end to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions is by far a better outcome than the alternatives, but only if Iran abides by it. To protect the future, we must understand the past.”