As President Obama begins his three-week push to win approval of the Iran nuclear deal, he is confronting this political reality: His strongest argument in favor of passage has also become his greatest vulnerability, The New York Times wrote on Monday.
Mr. Obama has been pressing the case that the sharp limits on how much nuclear fuel Iran can hold, how many centrifuges it can spin and what kind of technology it can acquire would make it extraordinarily difficult for Iran to race for the bomb over the next 15 years.
“His problem is that most of the significant constraints on Tehran’s program lapse after 15 years — and, after that, Iran is free to produce uranium on an industrial scale,” The New York Times wrote.
“The chief reservation I have about the agreement is the fact that in 15 years they have a highly modern and internationally legitimized enrichment capability,” said Representative Adam B. Schiff, a California Democrat who supports the accord. “And that is a bitter pill to swallow.”
The New York Times added: “In making the administration’s case, Mr. Obama can underscore that economic sanctions on Iran begin to lift only as it reduces its current stockpile of low enriched uranium, to 300 kilograms, or 660 pounds. That is not enough to make a single nuclear weapon, and is a 98 percent reduction in its current stockpile of nearly 12 tons.”
“The accord also calls for regular inspections at Iran’s nuclear installations and includes arrangements to reimpose international sanctions if the Iranians are caught cheating.”
“But the flip side is that after 15 years, Iran would be allowed to produce reactor-grade fuel on an industrial scale using far more advanced centrifuges. That may mean that the warning time if Iran decided to race for a bomb would shrink to weeks, according to a recent Brookings Institution analysis by Robert J. Einhorn, a former member of the American negotiating team.”
“Some members of Congress and other experts are urging the administration to take fresh steps to deter Iran from edging dangerously close to a nuclear weapons capability after the main limits in the agreement expire.”
“The duration of the agreement is the most important and complex issue. Under restrictions imposed by the accord, Iran would need a full year to produce enough nuclear material for a bomb; currently that timeline is two or three months, according to American intelligence agencies. But starting at year 10, that ‘breakout time’ would begin to shrink again, as Iran gets more centrifuges into operation.”
“Administration officials argue that it would be obvious if Iran made weapons-grade fuel, and negotiators secured a permanent ban on the metallurgy needed to turn the fuel into a bomb.”
“Supporters of the agreement are betting that improved intelligence would deter Iran from racing for a bomb. Under the agreement, inspectors will be able to monitor the production of rotors and other centrifuge components for up to 20 years and can monitor Iran’s stocks of uranium ore concentrate for 25 years.”
“Skeptics counter that, after 15 years, the United States would lose much of its leverage to stop a program. So Mr. Obama is trying to assure Congress that he and his successors will create that leverage.”
“Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz told a House committee last month that any attempt by Iran to produce highly enriched uranium ‘at any time must earn a sharp response by all necessary means.'”
“But some experts like Mr. Einhorn say that this warning should be conveyed directly, if privately, to Iran and that the United States should also increase intelligence sharing with the world’s nuclear inspector, the International Atomic Energy Agency, about possible Iranian cheating.”
“Critics of the accord note that Mr. Kerry and his chief negotiator, Wendy R. Sherman, said repeatedly that Iran must provide access to ‘people, places and documents’ that would resolve those questions, something Iran has refused to do for years. But the I.A.E.A. has never publicly specified what it is asking, or whom it must meet.”
“While the accord calls for regular inspections at Iran’s nuclear sites, the enforcement is of limited duration. For example, while the I.A.E.A. can request access to all declared nuclear sites under the agreements it has with all member states, the far more intrusive monitoring at Iran’s main nuclear enrichment site at Natanz is not mandated after 15 years. At that point, Iran also would be free to carry out nuclear enrichment at other locations.”
“But the issue that has garnered the most attention is a ’24-day’ rule for resolving disputes if Iran refuses to give inspectors access to a suspicious site — another measure that expires after 15 years. (After that, inspectors can still demand to enter sites, but under the existing rules, which do not set a deadline for compliance.) Critics say that is far different from ‘anywhere, anytime’ access — a phrase Mr. Moniz and others in the administration used a few months ago, and have come to regret.”
“If Iran balks at an inspection, then a commission — which includes Iran — can decide on punitive steps, including a reimposition of economic sanctions. A majority vote of the commission suffices, so even if Iran, China and Russia objected, the sanctions could go into effect.”
“That is the theory. In practice, reimposing sanctions could be politically challenging. Iran has warned that if sanctions are reimposed it will no longer be bound by the accord. The I.A.E.A., perhaps fearing its inspectors would be kicked out, might hesitate to start the 24-day clock.”
“Mr. Moniz argues that the 24-day time frame is sufficient because Iran will not be able to cover up evidence of nuclear work during that period, since traces of nuclear materials could be expected well after three weeks. But some experts say that Iran could cover up smaller-scale illicit activities, including work on the specialized high-explosives that might serve as a trigger in a nuclear bomb,” the paper added.
