NCRI

Iranian regime shaken by initial impact of Security Council resolution

NCRI – If one does not know about the nature of the ruling regime in Iran, one may be surprised by the aggressive and arrogant tone that its president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad constantly displays. One may also fall back into the mirage of reform, as some in the West cling to it, at the sight of the wind of revolt which has just risen. And yet, both aggression and division processes are closely interwoven.

The Tehran regime is based on Velayat-e- faqih, or (absolute clerical leadership). From the start, it had tried to ensure its survival by adopting an aggressive posture vis-à-vis the international community.

The regime began with eliminating all opposing forces through executions, torture and political and social repression. It then embarked on aggression toward the neighbouring countries, particularly Iraq.

While these policies have rendered the mullahs unpopular at home, the regime tried to guarantee its survival through internal purges and adopting an aggressive policy.  

We know from experience that this theocracy can only remain viable in an aggressive mode and that it is will not survive in a defensive mode. Therefore, as soon as it is put on the defensive, it would lose the elements of its survival and collapse from within.
 
The best illustration is the Iran-Iraq conflict. From its start until its penultimate year, in 1987, the regime kept on launching offensive after offensive to keep Iraq preoccupied and the increasing restive population in the country at bay. This way it mobilized its troops and deployed them on the front to feed the inferno of war.
 
During the last year of the conflict, an avalanche of blows forced it to be on the defensive. It took hardly a few months for Khomeini to abandon the war and swallow the “Chalice of the Poison of the cease-fire."
 
This pattern is being again today. Despite all the sloganeering and its dismissal of the Security Council resolution, the reality is that when this regime is under pressure, the ripple effect is felt in the entirety of the regime, in the heart of the system and in its own forces.
 
Let’s remember that the parliament was the first victim of an internal purge. This seventh legislature is the very essence of the Supreme Leader’s system of supremacy. The domination of the parliament was followed by ascension of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency. The system became monolithic.
 
Yet the adoption of the Security Council resolution and the pressure of sanctions – albeit watered down and prompted by some western countries’ reluctance to further pressure the regime, – forced the mullahs to retreat into a defensive position.
 
The new balance had immediate consequences on the monolithic apparatus; cracks began to appear, first in the parliament. Several deputies have just formed a new faction which is de facto outside the line imposed by the Supreme Leader. They criticized Ahmadinejad for the rising inflation and the high cost of living. The main cause of the split, however, is Security Council resolution.
 
These are the first setbacks in the war that the regime declared on the international community and the Iranian people. It cannot do anything to prevent further setbacks. The more intense the pressures, the more apparent the weaknesses will become. The time has come for the international community to adopt a firm policy towards the mullahs.
 
This approach would succeed with recognition of the explosive state of Iranian society and the deeply-rooted yearning for freedom among Iranians. This coupled with the international community standing with the Iranian people and their organized Resistance, which advocates democratic change, in place of appeasement and a foreign war, is a recipe for definitive success in resolving the Iranian crisis.

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