Since early summer, IRGC commander-in-chief, Mohammad-Ali (Aziz) Jafari, has started to implement sweeping changes within the IRGC. They characterize the most significant and unprecedented changes since the 1985 order by Rohallah Khomeini to equip the IRGC with an air force and a navy in addition to its ground forces. In the course of these extensive changes, the IRGC will shift focus from being a centralized force to having 31 distinct provincial brigades, the commanders of which will be given wide-ranging discretions.
Each of the 30 provinces in Iran will have an IRGC brigade. Tehran will be the only province with two brigades (31 brigades in total across the country). So far 20 of the 31 provincial commanders have been appointed to their posts, and the appointment of the rest is currently underway. Additionally, each brigade would also include a mullah to represent the interests of the regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Most of the 20 appointed commanders are second-tier brigadier generals. This indicates that the higher ranking commanders (with more previous experience) have been replaced by lower ranking officers.
The representation of the regime’s Supreme Leader at the IRGC has also been given a higher profile. Supreme Leader representation now includes a deputy, a coordinator, and a headquarters in Tehran, as well as representatives embedded in each provincial brigade, each with his own headquarters established in the province.
Reasons for the shift
After the regime began to close its ranks and conduct internal purges, and thus adopted a so-called one-legged political posture following Ahmadinejad’s ascent to power, on August 21, 2005, Khamenei issued an order for the creation of an IRGC Research and Command Center, with Mohammad-Ali Jafari as its coordinator. This was done in the course of crafting the desired strategy effectively conforming to the regime’s newly attained one-legged stance. In accordance with Khamenei’s orders, Jafari issued an unveiled threat by claiming, “If the enemy were to wage an attack against us, we would threaten its interests all over the world.”
The pertinent factors and the basis for the new strategy
During the past two years, the IRGC outlined the fundamentals of the new strategy, whose main tenets include:
• To terrorize and instill fear among the Iranian populace;
• To conduct terrorist operations against the regime’s perceived enemies, even in the latter’s own countries; and
• To obtain a nuclear bomb, considered to be the most vital element for the regime’s stability and consolidation of power. This objective has only been discussed within the regime’s private circles.
The appointment of Jafari as the IRGC commander-in-chief
In an order issued on September 1, 2007, Khamenei promoted Jafari, then-coordinator of the IRGC Research and Command Center, to the rank of major general and also appointed him to the post of commander-in-chief of the IRGC. His main mandate was to implement the newly crafted strategy within the IRGC.
On October 20, 2007, in his first official speech as the IRGC commander-in-chief, Jafari talked about the new strategy and stated, “Based on the guidelines issued by the Leader of the Islamic Republic, the strategy of the IRGC has been modified. Its main task now is to confront internal threats.” He went on to say, “Maintaining internal security normally lies within the purview of the State Security Forces and other security organs. However, if the magnitude of security challenges were to cross a certain threshold, with the permission of the Leader and the Supreme National Security Council, the IRGC would have to take overall charge of the situation.” The IRGC’s new commander-in-chief also indicated that the two vital objectives for his forces would be: First, having up-to-date intelligence about the perceived enemy’s movements and activities, and second, increasing the regime’s missile capabilities.
On November 1, 2007, Jafari characterized the 33-day war in Lebanon as the embodiment of the IRGC’s new strategy and claimed, “Since the enemy’s material and technological capabilities are superior to ours, we must move towards appropriate policies and means, enabling us to fulfill our requirements and ultimately force the enemy to experience defeat as it did during the 33-day war … One of the Americans’ vulnerabilities in the region is that they have established a presence all around Iran. Thus, they cannot keep themselves out of our firing range.”
Changes during Jafari’s 10-month tenure
Shortly after Ahmadinejad took office, Khamenei began to notice a rise in desertions within the IRGC’s ranks. IRGC commanders continue to display a tendency towards establishing more pronounced political and economic profiles, and exhibit substantially less enthusiasm to participate in potential military confrontations. The trend of desertions has entrapped even the top IRGC echelon, including its former highest-ranking officer, major general Rahim Safavi (Jafari’s predecessor). Safavi, once notorious for his fanatic outbursts calling on followers to “cut the throats” of all political dissidents, was even accused of being a “liberal” by Ahmadinejad’s government after his decision to leave the IRGC’s ranks. Khamenei was forced to remove Safavi and replace him with Jafari, a close confidant of Ahmadinejad.
One of the biggest organizational challenges during Jafari’s 10-month tenure has involved a wave of new requests for retirement, resignations, and refusal of service through payments. Therefore, at a time when Khamenei is taking measures to adapt the regime’s military structure to confront the potential threats of war, he is left with no other options but to resort to a massive purge of IRGC commanders whose services to the regime date back to the eight-year war with Iraq. Most have been replaced by a next generation of lower ranking individuals. Moreover, the pace of the purge is so extraordinary that in the span of 2 weeks, Jafari appointed 20 of the 31 provincial brigadier generals, most of whom are second-tier commanders (i.e. those who held subordinate posts during the eight-year war with Iraq).
The IRGC has 5 branches consisting of a grounds force, an air force, a navy, the paramilitary Bassij Force, and the extraterritorial Qods Force. Some of the changes these branches have undergone in the course of the new strategic shift include:
• Although the Qods Force takes is ongoing and daily operational orders from the IRGC, its strategic policies and executive orders come directly from Khamenei, who is the regime’s commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
• During Jafari’s tenure, the IRGC relieved the conventional navy of its control over the Persian Gulf operations, and took direct charge of those operations itself.
• The capabilities of the IRGC’s air force, which controls the regime’s missile development program, has been considerably bolstered. This is because, according to Jafari, the missile program is one the fundamental tenets of both the regime’s defensive and also offensive strategies in the current circumstances.
• The Bassij Force has been the focal point of the changes currently being implemented by Jafari. He set the stage with the slogan of “The IRGC’s duties now have an internal focus” (to safeguard the regime’s hold on power). Jafari began by removing the then-Bassij Force commander, Mohammad-Hossein Hejazi, from his post, appointing him instead as chief of the IRGC headquarters. He personally took over the command of the Bassij Force, and chose a cleric ,Hassan Taeb, as his deputy. Then in June 2008, in the course of the new round of changes, Jafari promoted Taeb to take over the Bassij command, with Hejazi appointed as his deputy.
• The IRGC’s ground forces have been restructured into 31 provincial brigades, with the Bassij Force units also reorganized in all provinces and reporting to IRGC provincial command.
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Reza Shafa is an expert on the Iranian regime's Intelligence networks, both in Iran and abroad.
He has done extensive research on Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) also known as VEVAK, Intelligence Office of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Qods Force among others. Currently he is a contributor to NCRI website