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Following the death of the Iranian regime’s President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei swiftly ordered preparations for the next presidential election. Over the past week, a broad spectrum of former and current state officials visited the Ministry of Interior, with some holding press conferences, releasing promotional videos on social media, and leaking news and rumors through their media contacts to build excitement for the June 28 election. Given that, since the 2017 and 2019 uprisings, elections in Iran have ceased to be a contest between Khamenei’s faction and his political rivals and have instead become a race between Khamenei’s favorite and some placeholder candidates, analysts and politicians worldwide are questioning whether Raisi’s death has altered the balance of power in Tehran.
According to state media, registration for candidates in the 14th presidential sham election began on Thursday, May 30, and ended on Monday evening, June 3. The candidates’ eligibility files, or more accurately, their suitability as determined by Khamenei’s Beyt, will be sent to the Guardian Council, which will announce the final list of candidates on June 11.
Based on official statistics, during the five-day registration period, 287 individuals applied, but only 80 were officially registered, considering the legal requirements for the presidency. Among the notable figures were Saeed Jalili, Khamenei’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council; Alireza Zakani, Mayor of Tehran; Mehrdad Bazrpash, Minister of Roads and Urban Development in Raisi’s government; Mostafa Pourmohammadi, former Minister of Interior and a main perpetrator in the 1988 massacre; Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, current Speaker of the Parliament; Vahid Haghanian, Deputy for Special Affairs in Khamenei’s office; former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; former Speaker Ali Larijani; former Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati; former Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri; and many other officials.
#Raisi’s Death Cripples Khamenei’s Decade-Long Project to Maintain Rule over #Iran https://t.co/ibcs5oMwbB
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 22, 2024
Given Tehran’s long history of deception and lack of transparency, analysts are questioning whether officials disqualified in previous rounds have received now Khamenei’s approval. They also wonder which of them will pass the Guardian Council’s scrutiny and what the implications of these developments are.
While definitive answers to these questions will likely emerge on June 12 and perhaps more clearly on July 1, a few points are already evident:
All regime leaders have sensed Khamenei’s significant weakness. Following a series of popular uprisings over the past seven years and the failed sham elections in 2020, 2021, and 2024, they understand that a widespread boycott and a resounding “no” from the Iranian people signal Tehran’s weakness to the world. They have come to grasp that a regime that tries to present itself as the region’s leading power is never taken seriously by foreign and regional adversaries when facing such internal disgrace.
Khamenei’s rival factions believe that after Raisi’s death, who was a key figure in his decade-long effort to consolidate power, coupled with Raisi’s subsequent economic, political, and social failures culminating in his and his foreign minister’s demise, the Supreme Leader might reconsider his approach amid a myriad of internal and external crises.
However, on June 3, at the commemoration ceremony of his predecessor Ruhollah Khomeini’s death, Khamenei outlined his vision for the ideal president and praised Ebrahim Raisi extensively, signaling that his preferred candidate should possess “similar qualities.” Khamenei’s repeated emphasis on the October 7 attacks and his statement that this was “a much-needed event for the region” clearly signaled that he views external crises as a means to alleviate internal tensions.
Who Is Vahid Haghanian, The Invisible Hand of Khamenei Now in #Iran’s Presidential Spotlighthttps://t.co/JbPvTZg5BG
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) June 1, 2024
The numerous statements by state officials from all stripes following the October 7 attacks also suggest that he is not wrong in this regard. Consequently, Khamenei intensified his rhetoric on regional destabilization, even sending messages to American students to pretend he could influence deep inside enemy territory.
Historically, the clerical regime has shown that everything is secondary and changeable when it comes to its fundamental principle of survival. Khamenei and all current and former officials prioritize mechanisms of survival above all else. Hence, to regain some credibility, Khamenei is likely to use all available resources and individuals to create what he deems “a dynamic electoral spectacle.” However, this will not come at the expense of questioning the regime’s security and survival.
This electoral display also has foreign policy benefits. Individuals and mouthpieces in the West who have always used to play in sync with Tehran, are already exploiting this strange array of presidential candidates to argue, for example, that issuing a resolution against Tehran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting could negatively impact candidates like Ali Larijani.
Nevertheless, should Khamenei decide to orchestrate a complex play with the pawns he has fielded, aiming to install the most criminal figure as president and once again declare war on Iranian society and the global community, he will not face rebellion or critical confrontation from those with the most skin in the game.
Khamenei, who has repeatedly stated that any retreat will lead to a series of regressions and ultimately the regime’s downfall, sees the least costly path as opting for an aligned and obedient government, enabling him to continue ruling with an iron fist. He banks on the international community’s inaction as well as the regime’s intimidation actions to create fear among the Iranian people.
However, he may underestimate the determination and capability of the organized resistance, which will rally both the most principled of the international community and the bravest within Iran to bring about regime change.
