Four-minute read
Today, it is universally acknowledged that true democracy and genuine elections are absent in Iran. Over the past four decades, the clerical regime has systematically eliminated or persecuted dissenters and even disqualified numerous former state officials through the Guardian Council, a tight-knit group of twelve directly and indirectly appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Hence, every electoral cycle has become a mere spectacle, devoid of any real democratic essence.
However, the recent sudden rise of Masoud Pezeshkian in the political landscape has left many politicians and analysts puzzled. Speculations about this decision are abundant, with supporting arguments for various theories. However, what is clear are the realities Khamenei is facing:
After 24 years of false promises about real change from within the regime by figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Hassan Rouhani, no serious political force or Western government harbors illusions about Pezeshkian. Besides lacking the political weight of his predecessors, he doesn’t even claim to deviate from Khamenei’s fundamental principles.
The Raisi project
Dreadful of popular uprisings demanding the overthrow of his regime since 2017, Khamenei initiated a years-long project to consolidate power. After failing to elevate Ebrahim Raisi to the presidency in the 2017 elections, Khamenei sidelined a serious rival, Sadeq Larijani, replacing him with Raisi as head of the judiciary the same year. As Chief Justice, Raisi purged internal rivals in the Judiciary, further tightening Khamenei’s grip.
After the nationwide uprising of the Iranian people in 2019 and the bloody suppression of the people’s revolt, Khamenei concluded that the only way to confront future uprisings was to consolidate the power in the regime at any cost and form a government with his most devoted pawn, namely Ebrahim Raisi.
In 2020, Khamenei “cleansed” the parliament of undesirables, filling the eleventh Majlis with former IRGC commanders. By 2021, after eliminating high-ranking officials like Ali Larijani to pave the way for Raisi’s rise to power, Khamenei took further steps to consolidate control by installing key IRGC figures in the government and regional administrations. This strategy enabled Khamenei to pursue grand adventures in the Middle East, overshadowing domestic uprisings with foreign conflicts like the one already ensuing in Gaza and the Red Sea.
For years, Khamenei’s twofold strategic priorities have been preserving the regime and ensuring his succession by a trusted figure, goals he was advancing through Raisi. However, Raisi’s sudden death dealt a significant blow to Khamenei, disrupting the regime’s internal balance with even the sidelined factions reemerging to conquer the executive helm.
The death of Ebrahim Raisi, the clerical regime’s President represents a monumental and irreparable strategic blow to the mullahs’ Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the entire regime, notorious for its executions and massacres. It will trigger a series of repercussions and crises… pic.twitter.com/2XW5a5NQoI
— Maryam Rajavi (@Maryam_Rajavi) May 20, 2024
Raisi was Khamenei’s key figure in consolidating the power inside the regime, and through this consolidation, Khamenei temporarily suppressed Iranian uprisings by intensifying internal repression and exporting crises abroad through regional conflicts.
Raisi’s death dealt Khamenei a strategic blow, and in this context, following the parliamentary elections that saw an 88 percent boycott, Khamenei was forced to choose between bad options for the presidential election after Raisi’s death. He began pleading for voter participation, understanding that if the other faction also boycotted the presidential election, divisions within the regime would widen further, potentially leading to a popular uprising.
Sensing Khamenei’s vulnerability, internal factions seized the opportunity to vie for power. In the preliminary candidate registration stage, Hassan Rouhani, Mohammad Khatami, and other rival faction leaders made it clear to Khamenei that disqualifying their candidates—Abbas Akhundi, Es’haq Jahangiri, and Massoud Pezeshkian—would lead them to join the boycott, causing significant embarrassment for Khamenei.
Consequently, the Guardian Council approved Pezeshkian, the least threatening candidate, despite his previous disqualification in the 2021 presidential election. The first round of the sham election, marked by a significant popular boycott, further destabilized Khamenei’s position. On July 3, Khamenei made an unprecedented admission, “In the first round, participation was less than expected. Many predictions were higher than what actually occurred. Though it is completely wrong to assume that those who did not vote in the first round are against the state.”
Vote rigging and Pezeshkian’s advancement to the second round signaled the rival factions that Khamenei needed help to legitimize his regime. Throughout the electoral campaign, state officials from all stripes contributed to the extensive propaganda to achieve the “epic participation” Khamenei needed to demotivate “foreign enemies.”
Early on July 5, while casting his vote, Khamenei preemptively declared “a warm reception for the election,” indicating his intention to announce high turnout numbers.
Khamenei Admits Historic Boycott in #Iran’s Sham Elections, Begs for Voter Turnouthttps://t.co/oNu4IeNV64
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 3, 2024
Why was Khamenei compelled to go with Pezeshkian?
Facing an unprecedented boycott of his sham election by the Iranian people and fearing internal strife, Khamenei was reluctant to disqualify Pezeshkian or even choose between Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, whose intense rivalry risked a political crisis reminiscent of 2009’s events.
In the Middle East, Khamenei is also facing the shadow of another war post-October 7 attacks, IRGC’s blacklisting by Canada, rising calls in the EU for similar actions, and potential policy tightening in Washington post-November elections, all posing significant threats to his regime.
Inside Iran, following Raisi’s death, Khamenei felt increasingly threatened by the activities of the MEK’s Resistance Units and their preparations for an uprising. These units had carried out over twenty thousand actions in support of Mrs. Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan and the regime’s overthrow, all within just a few months leading up to the Free Iran 2024 summit. The regime views the growing attraction of young people to the MEK as a daily threat. Furthermore, the National Council of Resistance’s progress on the international stage, coupled with widespread global support for both the Council and Mrs. Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan, has intensified Khamenei’s fear of being overthrown to unprecedented levels.
Caught between survival strategy and succession plans, Khamenei was forced to opt for the first, accepting an undesirable figure like Pezeshkian, and hoping to impose his policies on a weak president gradually.
The ongoing disputes among regime factions, including clashes between acting president Mohammad Mokhber and Pezeshkian, as well as the fierce feud between supporters of Ghalibaf and Jalili, indicate that Khamenei’s nightmare is far from over—it’s just beginning.