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Following a major popular boycott of the clerical regime’s sham presidential elections, internal strife and discord within the regime have escalated dramatically. Recent coverage in state-controlled media clearly indicates that these conflicts and infightings are likely to intensify with each passing day.
The state-run website, Rouydad 24, highlighted the deepening rift within the faction close to Khamenei, reporting, “The revolutionary front experienced a profound schism immediately after Pezeshkian’s victory. The blame is pointed at Saeed Jalili and his close associates, including Hamid Rasaei, Mohsen Mansouri, and Amirhossein Sabeti. Ghalibaf’s supporters attribute this failure to Jalili’s stubbornness and refusal to step aside.”
The official channel of Ghalibaf, the current speaker of the parliament and a defeated presidential candidate, criticized Jalili’s camp for spreading false information about a purported meeting involving Ghalibaf and a key figure from “the Resistance Front.” The channel stated, “The insistence of state loyalists for Jalili to withdraw was due to Ghalibaf’s higher standing in polarizing surveys and the potential for creating a fear-driven dichotomy against Jalili by the opposition, which indeed happened. However, Jalili ignored these clear reasons, resulting in the defeat of the revolutionary front.”
The arguments of Ghalibaf ‘s supporters and his campaign were met with a response from Amirhossein Sabeti, a member of parliament and senior advisor to Saeed Jalili. In a note on his Telegram channel, he stated, “Based on the popularity index, Jalili had more votes and naturally should have remained in the race,” adding, “After the first round, it was clear that his votes were about three times those of Ghalibaf.” Sabeti slammed the sitting Parliament Speaker, claiming that if Ghalibaf had stepped aside in favor of Jalili, Jalili could have won in the first round.
NCRI Editorial: #Iran’s Sham #Election Exposes Regime’s Fragility and People’s Resolvehttps://t.co/1CnrcQinZv
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 8, 2024
At the same time, the Maktoubat channel, one of the main media outlets close to Jalili, attacked Ghalibaf, accusing him of “formal actions” and “failing to fully mobilize forces” in support of Jalili during the election.
Mohammad Saeed Ahadian, Ghalibaf’s advisor, compared the election to the 2013 loss, questioning why the IRGC Quds Force commander like Esmail Qaani was involved in candidate negotiations in the first place.
Abbas Salimi Namin, another regime loyalist, remarked, “The conflict between Ghalibaf and Jalili supporters drastically lowers the level of political developments in the country.”
Mohamad Mehdi Hemmat tweeted, “This defeat could have been avoided if Jalili and his entourage hadn’t been so obstinate.”
On July 10, the newspaper Farhikhtegan blamed Jalili and his campaign team for their electoral defeat, accusing them of gross miscalculation and overestimating rural votes. Meanwhile, Mohammad Javad Zarif and Masoud Pezeshkian accused Jalili’s campaign of distributing money in rural areas during the election campaign.
Last week, Ali Aghazadeh, head of the election campaign for the Etedal Party, which supported Pezeshkian in the election, reported the distribution of money and food in rural areas and small towns, as well as negotiations with certain governors and village chiefs “in favor of a specific candidate.”
In #Iran’s Sham Presidential Election, the People Won and #Khamenei Losthttps://t.co/2SjElsj9ZK
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 7, 2024
Meanwhile, the Saberin News channel, close to the IRGC, blamed Jalili for ignoring the advice of regime high-ranking officials, leading to the bloc’s defeat. Concurrently, Jalili’s supporters accused the Guardian Council of orchestrating the election in favor of the so-called reformists by approving Pezeshkian’s candidacy.
Meanwhile, in clear contradiction to Khamenei’s efforts to glorify the slain president Ebrahim Raisi, former parliament member Gholamali Jafarzadeh Imenabadi disparaged the economic performance under Raisi, stating, “The past three years saw the worst economic performance, with inflation over 40% each year.” He highlighted widespread electoral misconduct, adding, “The government distributed extensive aid packages in villages to influence votes.”
As these disputes continue to unfold, the principlist faction remains deeply divided, not only highlighting the fractures within the regime but also exposing the vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in Khamenei’s political strategy. This division raises questions about the future stability and coherence of the regime in withstanding the social and international storms ahead.