NCRI – The consequences of Rafsanjani’s death appeared much sooner than expected during his funeral, turning the ceremony into a battle scene between the rival bands.
While the Rafsanjani-Rouhani band chanted “these too many people are here for their love for Akbar”, Khamenei’s responded “these too many people are here for their love for leader”. Menawhile, the fed-up crowd, ”, taking advantage of the gap between the two bands, were chanting “Dictator, Dictator”, “Our state television, our shame”, and “political prisoners should get released.” The unrest went far beyond Tehran, so that people in Mashhad chanted “Down with Khamenei” in addition to the mutual rhetoric between the two bands.
The conflict between the two rival bands began from the first hour following Rafsanjani’s death. Regarding his burial place, there was first speaking of Qom, and even Mashhad was mentioned at some point, but eventually Rafsanjani’s body was to be buried next to Khomeini’s tomb which shows behind-the-scene conflicts.
Also a number of news agencies belonging to Khamenei’s band reported at first that Khamenei attended Rafsanjani’s house and offered condolences to his family, but the report was removed from their websites within hours and was denied altogether later.
In his message for Rafsanjani’s death, Khamenei refused to use the word ‘Ayatollah’, a title commonly used by state radio and television for Rafsanjani. Instead, Khamenei referred to Rafsanjani only as ‘Hojatoleslam’, which is lower in rank compared to Ayatollah, according to Mullahs’ hierarchy. Khamenei didn’t point in his message to Rafsanjani’s special relations with Khomeini, either, and only mentioned Rafsanjani’s ‘opulent intelligence and rare intimacy in the past years’, which was somehow equivocally referring to the taunts of his own agents, accusing Rafsanjani of being imbecile, amnesiac and absentminded.
The answer is that the Mullahs’ regime is one with dual texture and structure, a disparate mix of an ultra-reactionary, middle-aged head called ‘vilayat-e faqih’ and a capitalism-dependent body with deep conflict of interests. This contrast was shown in confrontation between Rafsanjani and Khamenei in which Rafsanjani represented the dependent, capitalist section. With Rafsanjani’s death, neither has this section vanished, nor has it renounced its interests. As a result, regime’s inherent duality is still in place without being dissolved. Ironically, with the death of Rafsanjani, as someone who with his Mullah personality could somehow mitigate the conflict of interests, this contradiction is more than ever colored with conflict, and this is the same factor that has frightened the regime, with their fear being reflected in state media, particularly in those close to Rafsanjani’s band.
This concern will inevitably occur to all regime’s forces, especially now that Rafsanjani is gone, forcing them to detach from the regime out of distress, at a time when regime is surrounded by social, economic and regional crises. A concern for which there’s no answer, since this is an expired regime which has no future. A fact Rafsanjani was very well aware of and fell to the ground fearing the regime’s prospect. By the way, was this the same fear that took his life?
In his message, Khamenei also pointed to ‘disagreements and differences in religious approaches’ between himself and Rafsanjani.
Khamenei also didn’t mention the common term ‘goodness is all we know of him’ while reading the funeral prayer, a move widely reflected in cyber space which forced the regime to deny the news regarding the repeat of the funeral prayer, pointing out that the prayer was fully read by Khamenei.
With such an outward praise as “with the lack of Rafsanjani, I don’t know anyone that …” Khamenei actually sent a message to Rouhani not to have high hopes of taking Rafsanjani’s place in the expediency council or other entities, since the media close to Rouhani are saying that Rouhani is the only one who can and must replace Rafsanjani.
Thus, it becomes clear that, contrary to what some in Khamenei’s band are promising themselves, Rafsanjani’s death has not only not reduced regime’s contradictions and conflicts and will not lead to more solidarity and unity within the regime, but with lack of someone who could harness the ‘extremisms of both rival factions’, these contradictions will get out of control and follow a progressive path.
What is really frightening the regime, is not the very conflicts and contradictions within the regime, but their social repercussions, since the fed-up people are seeking the slightest gap in the regime to, similar to what they did in 2009, take to the streets and sweep away the regime with all its manifestations.
The question that arises here is that, regarding the conflict between rival bands, when one side is beheaded, the war will normally be over in favor of the other side. But how is it that here with Rafsanjani eliminated, not only the war is not over but it is aggravating as well?
