NCRI

Outward Diplomacy, Inner Turmoil: Iran’s Weakening Regime Heads Toward Revolt

Mehdi Oghbai

Midday July 22, Mohammad Javad Zarif, former Foreign Minister under Hassan Rouhani, and currently responsible for forming the Strategic Council and appointing ministers in Massoud Pezeshkian’s administration, posted on X in both Persian and English: “Irrespective of personal views on our Parliament’s Dec 2020 legislation on nuclear negotiations, it is the law of the land and must be complied with.”

This post was a response to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s comments during his meeting with parliament members. In his remarks, Khamenei defended the law that led to the regime’s non-compliance with the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and dismissed critics who had opposed his initiative.

Calling on the parliament to intervene in foreign affairs, Khamenei said on July 21, “The Parliament can empower the government in foreign affairs. Among the effective measures taken by the Parliament in the realm of foreign policy is the Strategic Action Law passed by the 11th Parliament. Although some have criticized and objected to this law, these objections are completely unfounded. The passing of this law was indeed a very correct and necessary action.”

During the sham election campaigns on June 18, Zarif stated that the Strategic Action Law hindered the U.S. from returning to the JCPOA. Also on June 22, Hassan Rouhani criticized the same law in a meeting with former ministers and deputies, calling it a betrayal to the people and claiming it had cost the country $300 billion.

For those familiar with developments in the Iranian regime following the sham elections, Zarif’s stance appeared to be a clear retreat after Khamenei’s sharp criticism. However, a deeper understanding of the regime’s complex interplay reveals that these developments indicate a significant weakening of the entire regime, particularly highlighting Khamenei’s increasingly shaky position.

In recent weeks, Khamenei-affiliated officials and media have launched severe attacks on Zarif. Friday Prayer leaders and Supreme Leader’s representatives nationwide have warned Pezeshkian to follow Ebrahim Raisi’s path, with some parliament members openly stating that cooperation with the new government hinges on his full adherence to Khamenei’s directives.

Despite Pezeshkian’s consistent declarations of loyalty to Khamenei and Ruhollah Khomeini’s ideals, his appointment of Zarif, a key figure from Rouhani’s administration, reveals his true stance towards Khamenei’s authority. On July 21, Khamenei told parliament members that the parliament and government should be united, urging a swift vote of confidence for the new administration, which on the surface seemed supportive of Pezeshkian but actually called for active parliamentary intervention in foreign policy, particularly on the nuclear program and Gaza.

Khamenei had stressed, “Don’t be calm and silent about Gaza. Today, a significant example of the Parliament’s activities in foreign affairs and diplomacy is the issue of Gaza.”

More than anything else, this reflects Khamenei’s weakened position, exacerbated by high election boycott rates in the last five consecutive sham elections as well as several nationwide uprisings with chants of “Death to Khamenei.”

In light of these political earthquakes, and particularly following Ebrahim Raisi’s death, the power struggle within the regime has intensified as factions vie for influence. Khamenei’s weakened position has emboldened leaders of rival factions to demand that the Guardian Council validate one of their three main candidates, threatening to join the boycott majority if their demands are not met. Even senior officials within Khamenei’s faction refused to unite behind a single candidate, forcing him to accept Pezeshkian to prevent internal conflict and quell fears of further uprisings.

Khamenei’s weakness is remarkably evident as he adopts a seemingly supportive tone towards Pezeshkian while mobilizing media and representatives to attack both him and Zarif.

However, Pezeshkian’s victory and cabinet formation do not signify a shift in power to the so-called “moderate faction.” Instead, it portends more division and power struggles as Khamenei’s faction still controls the core power structures and will fiercely suppress any divergence.

In a parliament session on July 21, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned Pezeshkian, “The people expect the Twelfth Parliament to support the Fourteenth Government without partisanship, ensuring the government sees the parliament by its side. With elections over, the focus should be on solving the people’s issues. As long as the government follows the Supreme Leader’s guidelines and addresses these problems, the parliament will support it.”

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, head of the Judiciary, reiterated the need for adherence to the Supreme Leader’s policies, emphasizing the value of Pezeshkian’s commitment to these goals during his campaign and post-election.

One day after Khamenei met with MPs, the Kayhan Daily warned Pezeshkian against ending up like Abolhassan Banisadr who was dismissed by former Supreme Leader Khomeini. Comparing Zarif to the regime’s formidable threat, Kayhan wrote, “Over 45 years, the hypocrites [regime’s pejorative to slander against the MEK] have damaged the reputations of several presidents, relentlessly pursuing them until they were ousted. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr is a prime example; his office became a hub for the MEK to sow discord and chaos during Saddam’s war. Imam Khomeini warned Bani-Sadr that the people around him were destructive, but Bani-Sadr ignored these warnings, believing in their loyalty.”

Meanwhile, the state-run HamMihan newspaper wrote, “Currently, hardline and conservative newspapers, Friday prayer pulpits, cyber accounts, and Principlist politicians have turned their focus against Zarif. Some use harsh language, while others express their criticisms more subtly and indirectly.”

The daily quoted a former parliamentarian as saying, “The ultimate goal is to target Pezeshkian.”

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