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After weeks of relentless propaganda, pleas, and power struggles, the spectacle of replacing Ebrahim Raisi, the notorious executioner-turned-president who met an abrupt end, has concluded. This costly endeavor, both materially and politically, forced the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, to retreat from his goal of consolidating power.
In the past five consecutive elections, Khamenei faced massive boycotts from the people as well as from factions within his regime that branded themselves as “reformists” and “moderates.” This time, to avoid another international embarrassment and the disintegration of his regime, he was compelled to grant significant concessions and a share of power to former allies and current arch-rivals.
Seizing the opportunity, Khamenei attempted to project strength, disregarding numerous domestic and international reports of an unprecedented election boycott. He boldly claimed, “The dear people, with a sense of responsibility, turned out in large numbers, creating a lively and passionate scene, filling the ballot boxes in two rounds with over 55 million votes.”
Masoud Pezeshkian, the least threatening figure from Khamenei’s rival faction allowed to participate in this theatrical presidential race, had spared no opportunity to display his loyalty to Khamenei. During the campaign, he donned the uniform of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for photo ops and repeatedly, both before and after his declared victory, paid homage to the slain Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, and he unequivocally opposed any deviation from Khamenei’s directives.
Now, Khamenei’s fractured regime faces a dense array of internal, regional, and international crises that it can neither ignore nor adequately address. The faction loyal to Khamenei, now splintered by the electoral defeat, is blaming each other for this significant loss. As self-styled “opposition,” they are poised to obstruct Pezeshkian’s efforts to form a government and manage the executive branch amid numerous crises. Stocked with bitter memories of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Rouhani’s administrations, the headlines from IRGC-affiliated media about the new government which they have resentfully dubbed the “third Rouhani government,” are more than predictable.
The clerical regime in #Iran is approaching the elections amidst broad societal disenchantment. Officials and state media anticipate record-high election boycotts compared to any other year. pic.twitter.com/J0HLl554pt
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) February 14, 2024
Iran’s enraged society will increasingly vocalize its demands for freedom of expression, internet access, dress code liberalization, the release of political prisoners, economic equity, and countless other legitimate rights. The looming specter of local and nationwide uprisings weighs heavily on both Pezeshkian and Khamenei, with the 91% boycott of the presidential show and the 93% boycott of parliamentary elections serving as a stark reminder.
Given the bloody crises in the Middle East, regional countries have no patience for Tehran’s interventions. Should the regime persist in its missile expansionism and sectarian warmongering, it will further isolate itself regionally. Additionally, if it does not scale back its nuclear ambitions, arms shipments to the Ukraine conflict, or international terrorism, it will face a more resolute approach from Washington, a tougher government in Canada post-IRGC designation, and a new leadership in the UK and EU.
Thus, Khamenei faces a critical choice: continue with successive retreats, weakening his fragmented regime and making it more vulnerable to the new imminent uprisings from the Iranian people, or persist with his current stance, sacrificing Pezeshkian and his domestic supporters, continuing his confrontation with both Iranian society and the world, and accepting the consequent repercussions.
Either way, Khamenei has dug his own grave and soon, he will share Raisi’s fate.