By: Reza Shafa
Expanding IRGC’s role in domestic suppression and terrorism abroad
IRGC’s Liberation Movement Unit, in 1981, was a part of then Public Relations office. However, that changed in 1984 and the unit dissolved into the Intelligence Unit (IU). In 1986, the IU developed two garrisons, Ramadan and Ballal to organize its terrorist operations. Ballal Garrison was specialized in expanding terrorism and fundamentalism in other counties while Ramadan concentrated on carrying out special operations as well as guerrilla warfare in Iraq.
Upon establishment of Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in 1984, IU which had been assigned to suppress the democratic forces in the country handed over such responsibilities to MOIS. More than ninety percent of the newly formed ministry personnel had come from the IU.
On September 17, 1985, in a directive, Khomeini ordered the IRGC to divide the force into a classical pattern by creating sea, land and air forces. In less than three years later, on July 1988, then IRGC commander, Mohsen Rezaii appeared on the state television announcing the final defeat in the war that up to its end cost only on Iran’s side, according to Rafsanjani, more than a trillion dollars. However, the Iranian regime had never published the actual causality counts in the eight-year long mullahs’ adventure.
Following the end of the war, many in the regime called for an end to IRGC’s service. But Khomeini reminded them that it was wrong to think only of the force in the context of Iran-Iraq war; that the force coming out of a major regional war, regardless of its defeat, has earned enough experience to do exactly what Khomeini had intended from the scratch for IRGC. Furthermore, the mastermind of the war pointed out that IRGC from the beginning had different task than to fight for homeland; it was meant to expand Islam beyond the Iranian borders. Such an opinion coming from the top brought with it lots of changes in the IRGC’s infrastructure from 1988 and 1990.
To begin, the IRGC’s internal division was expanded into five forces. Adding two strong levers in line with the mandate Khomeini had in mind. Two extra arms were the paramilitary Bassij force, designed to putdown the popular uprisings, and the deadly Qods Force for expanding the so-called Islamic Revolution to other countries. What it really meant was exporting mullahs’ brand of Islam first to the neighbors, and if successful, then to as far geographically as it was possible. One other significant step was dissolving the Ministry of IRGC into the Ministry of Defense (MoD). With such a change MoD went directly under the IRGC’s hegemony and since, it has always been run by the commanders designated by it. Since its inception, military hierarchy had not been adopted by the IRGC in a populist move to build a good reputation among masses as a force from the people and for them. Shah’s army did not have a good image in public because of its suppressive nature. As it was no longer feasible to run the establishment like the past, IRGC adopted classic ranking like other national armies in the world.
To be continued
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Reza Shafa is an expert on the Iranian regime’s intelligence networks, both in Iran and abroad. He has done extensive research on VAVAK (MOIS), IRGC’s Intelligence Office, and Quds Force among others. Currently he is a contributor to NCRI website.
