By: Reza Shafa
If one vigilantly examines the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) statute, he will come across some very interesting facts. The most important one being: The IRGC was established in 1979 to protect the Islamic Republic.
The mullahs’ regime is based on two pillars: suppressing voices of dissent in the country and exporting terrorism abroad. The main role in both of these has been left to the IRGC.
It is quite evident from the outset that the ruling mullahs have created the force to ensure their vitality in any foreseeable crisis.
The Revolutionary Guards are 500,000 strong, and its ranks are all under the direct control of the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei; commanding officers are entirely hand picked by him. IRGC is comprised of five forces: Ground, air, sea, Quds, and Bassij.
The IRGC’s ground forces are stationed in all Iranian major cities and act as the backbone of the mullahs’ forces for maintaining the security. For each of Iran’s 30 provinces, with the exception of Tehran which has two IRGC divisions, one IRGC brigade is assigned.
Since all other security forces, one way or the other, are offshoots of the IRGC, a prime example being the State Security Forces (SSF), the force is extremely vital for the regime’s survival in any foreseeable domestic security threats.
What does the Quds Force do for the IRGC?
The idea of having such a force goes as far back as the time of Khomeini himself.
In the midst of the factional fighting in Lebanon, the IRGC was assigned by him to help the so-called Muslims in that country. The Quds Force is 21,000 strong and was officially founded in 1993.
The force has a very broad scope and is not restricted by any geographical boundaries. The way Quds Force operates is like having two foreign ministries in one country with various departments set for regions of the world and all the regime’s embassies have their own officers who report to the Quds Force headquarters in Tehran.
In order to have a foot step in the neighboring countries: Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are tactical bases in the Iranian provinces adjacent to each country. Such bases are directly responsible for the regime’s terrorist activities in each country. To examine one of such garrisons, one can take the most active, Ramadan Base with four tactical bases along the 1,200 kilometer border with Iraq. Nasser, Raad, Zafar, and Fajr are sprawling along the border from north to south.
In December, 2006, these bases and their activities were revealed for the first time by the Iranian Resistance. It is through these bases that thousands of individuals are recruited and dispatched to various camps in suburban Tehran and Qom for trainings. Some of them are specialized in training Iraqi militias and the others are working on other areas.
With a classical military force, such as national armies in the world, they hardly get involved in the nation’s economy let alone dominating the entire banking system, most of oil and gas industries, and a heavy influence on the imports and exports. But it is a fact in Iran today that IRGC has its grip on the Iranian market and trade.
IRGC’s terrorist activities abroad cost billions of dollars. For instance its operations in Iraq alone cost $3 billion a year. Adding to that another $1 billion for its adventures in Lebanon and the list goes on.
To finance its operations, following the Iran-Iraq war ending in 1988, the IRGC used a big part of its engineering units and machinery to back the construction projects relegate to it by the government without having to compete with others.
In 2004, estimates are that the IRGC’s projects were in excess of $12 billion and for 2007, the financial conglomerate will earn 57 percent of the nation’s imports and exports as well as 30 percent of its non-oil exports. To run the giant, the IRGC has established over 1000 financial corporations spreading from United Arab Emirates to East Asia and from Europe to Africa and even South America. These entities have provided cover for IRGC’s illegal activities throughout the world.
To do away with the usual checks, IRGC has expanded its network outside the government framework for two reasons: first to get by the international controls which come with such transactions and second to be able to launder the money generated through the illegal deals mostly received from the cover organizations set by the IRGC.
Very little has been said about the IRGC and its terrorist activities other than what the Iranian Resistance has revealed over the years.
Since the designation of IRGC and its offspring the Quds Force by the US, it is high time to fully concentrate on the most dangerous and well organized terrorist entity in the world to ensure global security.
Reza Shafa is an expert on the Iranian regime’s intelligence networks, both in Iran and abroad. He has done extensive research on VAVAK (MOIS), IRGC’s Intelligence Office, and Quds Force among others. Currently he is a contributor to NCRI website.
